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ABSTRACT
Law enforcement incentives have become a relevant discussion topic in recent
years. Starting with sheriff offices, elections may introduce different incentives
for sheriffs, impacting arrest rates and other behaviors around election periods.
My first chapter examines the impact of both the primary and general elections on
arrest rates in sheriff jurisdictions. Results show that offices led by a sheriff run-
ning for re-election see a decrease of 0.19 arrests per 1,000 capita following a loss
in the primary. Offices with incumbents who win the primary but proceed to lose
the general show 0.62 fewer arrests per 1,000 capita in the month following the
general election. Further results indicate the decline following the loss in the gen-
eral election stems mostly from drug arrests. These results suggest the electoral
structure influences sheriff behavior, negatively impacting sheriff productivity, in-
dicating substantial costs to elections, and possibly indicating different incentives
across sheriffs during the election season.
Revenue generated through the criminal justice system has also been shown
to cause a change in the incentive structure of law enforcement agencies. I show
evidence of this first in my second chapter through a second-stage estimation of
the effect of civil asset forfeiture laws on estimated law enforcement technical
efficiency scores. Agencies allowed to retain proceeds from asset seizure have an
incentive to generate revenue. I estimate how counties utilize police personnel and
expenditures to maximize crime deterrence and incident clearances. Technical
efficiency estimates are computed at the county level from 2007 and 2012 data
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using the variable returns to scale data envelopment analysis estimator. To reduce
estimation error and to allow for faster convergence, I use dimension reduction
to estimate the Farrell output measure of police efficiency for county-level data.
After testing for separability, results of a second-stage truncated regression show
that the higher the allowed percentage of retained assets for a county, the more
inefficient the county is at making arrests and deterring crime.
I conclude in my third chapter by discussing the growing law enforcement
revenue generation incentive and how law enforcement revenues have become a
key component of local government budgets across the United States. While nu-
merous restrictions exist to constrain traditional sources of revenue, only recently
have legislators introduced checks on the fiscal profitability of fines, fees, forfei-
tures, and asset seizures. Left unrestricted, fiscal incentives have demonstrably
manifested in the enforcement patterns and discretionary decisions of police. The
transformation of officers into agents of revenue creation leads to increased tar-
geting of minority populations and out-of-towners, with emphasis on arrests that
yield potential property seizure, with negative consequences for both community
trust and the provision of public safety. Those burdened with legal financial obli-
gations are disproportionately poor, positioning the criminal justice system as a
pointedly regressive form of taxation. We discuss the mechanisms behind crim-
inal justice revenue generation, the consequences to law enforcement outcomes,
and policies designed to reform and mitigate revenue-driven law enforcement.
iii
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CHAPTER 1
FIRED WITH EIGHT MONTHS’ NOTICE
1.1 Introduction
The county sheriff is the only chief law enforcement officer to be elected to his
position. Elections throw a wrench into the regular day-to-day of a sheriff’s office,
creating unique incentives and potentially impacting sheriff behavior in varying
ways.
Entering an election cycle, the current sheriff has two choices: he can either
choose to run or not run for re-election. Those who decline to run for re-election
could be retiring or taking another job. In these cases, the sheriff may lose the
incentive to answer to constituents or to continue working diligently.
A sheriff who plans on maintaining his status as sheriff, however, may
substitute his time away from running the sheriff’s office to campaigning for re-
election. In order to secure his position in the next term, the sheriff needs to
appeal to voters and garner support—a time-consuming task that potentially leads
to neglect of the current office. Another consideration is that the actions he takes
while in office could have an impact on his election chances, as voters ultimately
decide who will be sheriff.
Post-election, policing incentives may depend on the results. Losing the
election would be comparable to being fired. The losing sheriff may no longer
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worry about appeasing constituents. He could potentially be an unwilling or angry
lame duck until the newly elected sheriff takes office—up to ten months—or he
may lack the desire to execute his regular responsibilities. He also now has to find
another job, possibly taking time away from his current job during the lame duck
period.
Changes in behavior could show a decline in sheriff office productivity.
A sheriff neglecting his office or his duties for any reason, whether to take time
away to campaign or simply to shirk his regular responsibilities, is a danger to
the productivity of policing by the sheriff’s office. Risking sheriff productivity
begs the question, exactly how significant are the costs to electing the chief law
enforcement officers in counties?
This paper uses arrests per capita by a sheriff’s office as a measure of
changing sheriff behaviors to determine the costs of elections. I examine the
monthly patterns surrounding both the primary and general elections for sheriff
offices, distinguishing between sheriffs running and sheriffs not running in the
next election. My main findings show that sheriffs in office who lose either the
primary or the general election make significantly fewer arrests following the lost
election. In the months following a loss in the primary, the sheriff makes about
0.19 fewer arrests per 1,000 capita. Similarily, those sheriffs who win the primary
but go on to lose the general election make 0.62 fewer arrests per 1,000 capita in
the month following the general election—before the newly elected sheriff takes
office. Further results show the decline following the general election stems pri-
marily from drug arrests—arrests that are more discretionary by nature.
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This paper outlines some of the costs associated with sheriff elections.
Significant negative changes in sheriff behavior during the election cycle would
indicate higher costs, stemming specifically from differing incentives during the
election cycle. Costs associated with the elections may include a decline in job
performance—i.e. fewer arrests. There is also the potential for turnover costs.
Following an election loss or the retirement of a sheriff, the winner of the election
steps in. It may take him some time to adjust to running the office, potentially
leading to fewer arrests during the first few months in office.
One examination of the costs of sheriff elections is that of Greenblatt
(2018), discussing the incentives of “bad sheriffs.” He analyzes the strong in-
centive for sheriffs to abuse their powers. A vast amount of money goes through
the sheriffs’ hands, ranging from fines and fees to asset seizures, without a sec-
ondary budgetary officer. There are often wrongful death lawsuits or excessive
force accusations, but given the nature of their position, it is difficult to get rid
of a sheriff (Greenblatt, 2018). Local government officials can fire local police
chiefs, but since they are elected by the public, there is usually no way to fire a
sheriff between elections. And oftentimes the sheriff has so much influence there
are threats of harassment and intimidation for anyone who might dare get in the
way. Despite having to answer to voters, often they can be in office for more than
20 years (Greenblatt, 2018). Especially in small counties, few challengers step up;
average sheriff tenure is estimated at 11 years, while estimates of average police
chief tenure range from two-and-a-half years to six years (Zoorob, 2020).
Elected sheriffs also have an incentive to be lulled into corruption. For
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example, since 2010, ten county sheriffs in the state of South Carolina have been
convicted of crimes while in office, and two others are awaiting trial (Collins,
2020). One of them, suspended Chester County Sheriff Alex Underwood, filed for
re-election in the 2020 election. As he has pleaded not guilty (Dys & Derickson,
2020), he is legally allowed to run again as long as he is not convicted at trial
(CN2 News, 2020).
This is not to say there are not benefits associated with elected sheriffs. The
National Sheriff’s Association (NSA) believes election is the best option as “An
‘Elected’ Office of Sheriff is ‘Directly’ accountable and responsible to the will
of the people in our Representative Democracy in providing public safety/law
enforcement for their local communities.”1 As evidence, sheriffs make fewer
seizures than appointed police chiefs (Mughan et al., 2019). Property seizures,
allowed by asset forfeiture laws, are revenue enhancing (Benson et al., 1995;
Baicker & Jacobson, 2007; Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008; Holcomb et al., 2011;
Makowsky et al., 2019; Graham & Makowsky, forthcoming) and generally have
negative associations by voters (Mughan et al., 2019). By making fewer seizures,
sheriffs are following the will of the people—in both election and non-election
years—providing evidence to support the NSA’s claim.
This paper contributes to the literature by empirically documenting the
shirking of sheriffs following a loss at the polls. To my knowledge, no other work
estimates sheriff arrest patterns on a monthly basis during election season. I also
add to the electoral structure literature. Prior work regarding elected judges and
1See National Sheriffs’ Association 2010 Resolutions.
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attorneys indicates a change in behavior toward more punitive actions nearing the
election cycle (Huber & Gordon, 2004; Nadel et al., 2017). My research sug-
gests sheriffs are different. A more punitive pattern for sheriffs would mean more
arrests during election season, but results indicate, especially for those that lose
the primary or general elections, arrests by the sheriff’s office tend to decrease
drastically.
1.2 The County Sheriff
Sheriffs in colonial America were modeled after the English “shire-reeve,” who
was appointed by governors as a royal officer. The English political figure served
and protected the King’s interests in the shire (Falcone & Wells, 1995; Facchini
et al., 2020). The modern sheriff in the United States (US) is similar to the colo-
nial sheriff, with the biggest difference being that the modern US sheriff is elected.
Post-revolution, many states included the sheriff as an elected office in their con-
stitutions in order to make sheriffs accountable to the local community. Under
the new sheriff election model, the sheriff needed a good relationship with voters
so they would re-elect him in the next election (Falcone & Wells, 1995; Facchini
et al., 2020).
Sheriffs today are still elected in 46 states, mandated by most of their con-
stitutions. There are no sheriffs in Alaska or Hawaii, the office was abolished in
Connecticut in 2000, and the governor appoints the sheriffs in Rhode Island. In
addition, a select few counties independently opt to appoint their sheriff.2 The
2See Elected Office of the Sheriff: Executive Summary.
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elected sheriff answers to the voters; he cannot have his powers or responsibilities
restricted by county boards or commissioners (Falcone & Wells, 1995). Accord-
ing to Falcone & Wells (1995), the sheriff’s office “has remained one of the most
viable policing institutions in the United States” and “is a necessary and effective
general purpose police agency and will most likely continue to be such as long
as county-level government exists.” Most of these sheriff elections are partisan
elections with four-year terms. Five states—California, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Oregon, and Tennessee—have nonpartisan elections, while the remaining 41 hold
partisan elections. The states with sheriff offices not having four-year terms are
as follows: Arkansas and New Hampshire have two-year terms, New Jersey has a
three-year term, and Massachusetts has a six-year term.3
Sheriff offices also range in size. The smallest offices have one to two
employees, while the largest sheriff’s office is that of Los Angeles county, where
they employed a total of 16,766 full-time employees, 9,351 of which are full-
time sworn employees, in 2016 (Brooks, 2019). The majority of sheriff offices,
though, are small, with about 55% of sheriff’s offices employing less than 25 full-
time sworn officers in 2016 (Brooks, 2019). Only 4% employed more than 250
full-time sworn officers, and that top 4% employed almost half (47%) of all full-
time sworn officers nationwide (Brooks, 2019). The offices that are very large
tend to form units that specialize in different tasks (Falcone & Wells, 1995). The
office is, in a way, separated into smaller sub-offices to complete each different
type of duty, making the largest offices fundamentally different from the others.
3See Office of Sheriff State-by-State Elections Information.
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Though duties vary by county and state, the majority of sheriffs are the
chief law enforcement officers of the county, with primary jurisdiction in the un-
incorporated parts of the county. Some counties also have jurisdiction in incorpo-
rated areas of the counties or are contracted out to incorporated areas (National
Sheriffs’ Association and others, 1977; Falcone & Wells, 1995; Bulman, 2019).
As of 1977, 93% of all county sheriffs perform law enforcement functions (Na-
tional Sheriffs’ Association and others, 1977). In addition to the four states lack-
ing elected sheriffs, sheriffs in Delaware, DC, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania
are restricted from law enforcement duties (Bulman, 2019). The majority of sher-
iffs also have control of the county jails, operating 85% of jails in the US (Zoorob,
2020). Many also perform court function, e.g. bailiff duties, in addition to law en-
forcement duties. Others solely provide security for the courthouse (Greenblatt,
2018). Other duties for some sheriffs include collecting county fees and taxes or
selling licenses and permits (Falcone & Wells, 1995; Facchini et al., 2020).
Brown (1978) describes four different types of sheriff organizational mod-
els that have emerged, summarized well by Falcone & Wells (1995):
The “full-service model” carries out law enforcement, judicial and
correctional duties. The “law enforcement model” (Multnomah County,
Oregon) carries out only law enforcement duties, with other duties
assumed by separate civil process and correctional agencies. The
“civil-judicial model” involves only court-related duties (counties in
Connecticut4 and Rhode Island). Finally, the “correctional-judicial
model” (San Francisco County) involves all functions except law en-
forcement.
4As previously mentioned, Connecticut’s sheriffs’ offices were abolished in 2000.
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The most common, or the traditional model is the “full-service model” (Falcone
& Wells, 1995).
A sheriff office is structured such that there exists a boss (the sheriff) and
workers (sheriff deputies). It seems to reason that a decrease in productivity from
the sheriff himself may impact the productivity of his deputies (and thus show a
reduction in arrests for the office as a whole). Including managerial talent multi-
plicatively in a standard production function leads to the marginal product of labor
depending on the managerial talent. Using firms in the technology sector, Lazear
et al. (2015) show that higher quality bosses increase total productivity substan-
tially. Applying this theory to the sheriff election setting, managerial talent is
depicted as the sheriff’s own effort, while output would be measured as arrests by
the sheriff’s office. Thus by this theory, the productivity of the sheriff’s deputies
would decline when the sheriff’s own effort declines around an election. This is
evidence supporting the idea that a decline in effort by a sheriff surrounding an
election could cause a decline in productivity throughout the entire sheriff office.
Another channel through which a decline in sheriff effort leads to a decline in
office productivity is through possible political pressure. Under pressure to in-
crease or decrease arrests, the sheriff may dictate those pressures to his deputies,




Even with the list of costs associated with sheriff elections, there is not a lot of
prior literature regarding the effects of the electoral process on sheriff behavior.
The most closely related research is that of Hill & Zoorob (n.d.). They also exam-
ine the effects of electoral incentives structure on the behavior of elected sheriffs.
Using yearly data from sheriff offices and local police departments in Arkansas
between 2005–2015, they estimate the effect of being a sheriff in an election year.
They found that sheriff discretionary arrests declined by around 15% in election
years, while there were no changes for homicide and manslaughter arrests. My
paper, however, uses monthly data for a wider range of states to target more spe-
cific patterns in the months surrounding the elections. Zoorob (2020) also has
a working paper that estimates the incumbency advantage for sheriffs. He finds
that incumbents have an estimated 43 percentage point increased probability of
winning the next election, which is a larger advantage than for most other offices.
Several other papers use arrest patterns to show racial disparities in law
enforcement. When blacks gained the right to vote from the Voting Rights Act in
1965, there were more registered black voters who had a say in who their sheriff
was (Facchini et al., 2020). Sheriffs were held more accountable for their ac-
tions, and thus black arrest rates fell in the counties covered by the legislation and
having larger shares of black to white populations (Facchini et al., 2020). The
voting rights in turn led to the improved treatment of minority groups by elected
law enforcement offices. Sheriff offices also change their behavior when sheriffs’
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deputies gain the right to collectively bargain (Bulman, 2019). Comparing sher-
iffs’ offices to police departments who were unaffected by the judicial decision
to allow sheriffs’ deputies to organize, Dharmapala et al. (2019) show collective
bargaining led to an increase in violent misconduct incidents at sheriff’s offices.
Sheriff behavior is also affected by civil asset forfeiture laws. Compared to local
police departments, sheriff offices seize less property because there are electoral
costs for sheriffs associated with property seizures—voters do not favor forfeiture
laws (Mughan et al., 2019). There are also slight differences in behaviors based on
personal views held by the sheriffs or even the sheriff’s attitude. Attitudes of po-
litical leaders influence both violence against women policies (Farris & Holman,
2015) and immigration policies (Farris & Holman, 2017).
Bulman (2019) shows the ratio of Black-to-White arrests is significantly
higher under White sheriffs, using racial transitions between different sheriffs.
These results are also driven by offenses where there is greater discretion by law
enforcement and where the sheriff has greater control over hiring and policing
strategies. Thompson (2020) explores differences in sheriff offices based on the
sheriff’s party affiliation. Using sheriff compliance with federal requests to detain
unauthorized immigrants to determine if parties behave differently, he finds that
Republicans and Democrats comply at nearly the same rate, showing law enforce-




Arrest data are available from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NI-
BRS), accessed via the FBI’s Crime Data Explorer. Total arrests were calculated
from the arrestee files for each sheriff’s office by ORI code at the month level. I
also extracted total arrests for each of four categories: drug arrests, DUI arrests,
violent arrests, and property arrests. In addition, I calculated total incidents for
the violent and property categories in order to calculate arrest to incident ratios
for each month. Violent crimes include murder/nonnegligent manslaughter, rape,
robbery, and aggravated assault. Property crimes include burglary/breaking and
entering, pocket-picking, purse-snatching, shoplifting, theft, and all other larceny.
The county’s estimated annual population is also included in the NIBRS data. Any
observation with missing population data is dropped. Law enforcement data are
summarized in Table 1.1.5 All three of Arrests/Cap., Drug Arrests/Cap., and DUI
Arrests/Cap. are scaled by 1,000. Included in this table is the percent of observa-
tions that are 0. This percentage is much lower, 5.5%, for total arrests per capita
than for any of the individual crime categories. The distributions for each category
are also depicted as histograms in Figure 1.1. It is very clear that any model for
the individual crime categories should take into account the large number of 0’s.
I suspect the main reason there are so many 0’s for each category is because each
sheriff’s office may not investigate the same types of crimes.
Sheriff election data are not available in one centralized location. Depend-
5All tables except Table 1.3 were created using the stargazer package in R (Hlavac, 2018).
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ing on the state or county, election results are available on the state’s secretary
of state website or each individual county clerk or election commission website.
Since not all states report to NIBRS, I target those states and counties that do
report to NIBRS for election data collection.
Most sheriff elections take place every four years, not all of them in the
same year as the presidential election. Panel a of Figure 1.2 shows the distribution
of the election year for the elections in my sample. All of the states in my sample
have sheriff elections every four years, with the exception of New Hampshire.
For the New Hampshire counties, I have a set of election results for both 2014
elections and 2016 elections. Some states also have counties with elections in
different years. For example, South Carolina and Maine have some counties with
elections in 2014, and other counties with elections in 2016.
My sample includes elections between 2014–2016. For the election year
in my sample period for each county, I gathered the name of the winner and any
opponent names in the general election, each candidate’s party (if available), the
number of votes for each candidate, total votes cast, and the month of the elec-
tion. All of the general elections took place at the beginning of the month. I also
collected information from the same year’s primary election for each party if that
county had a primary for the sheriff elections. This information includes which
parties had primaries, whether each candidate had an opponent in his primary, and
the primary month. The date of the primary election varies by county; some take
place at the beginning, some in the middle, and some at the end of the month. I
then collected the name of the winner from the previous general election to deter-
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mine if there was an incumbent running in either the primary or the general elec-
tion in my sample period. For example, sheriff elections in Nebraska occur every
four years—in 2014 within my sample. For each of the counties with available
election information in Nebraska, I collected 2014 candidate general and primary
information, and then collected the winner of the election in 2010 to determine if
there was an incumbent running in the 2014 general and primary elections.
For those counties where candidate party information were unavailable, I
supplemented the data with party information from news articles about that candi-
date. In finding the supplemental party information, I came across a few sheriffs
who left office in between the normal election cycle. The two types of cases where
this happened were 1) if the sheriff was corrupt and he resigned or was removed
from office, or 2) if the sheriff decided to retire early—before the next election
cycle. Depending on the county and when the sheriff left office between election
cycles, the county either held a special election or the governor appointed a sher-
iff to fill the slot until the next election. For the special elections, I dropped the
observations in the period just before the sheriff left office up through the period
after the newly elected sheriff took office, since the goal of this paper is to gain a
better understanding of the regular election cycle. In the case of the governor ap-
pointing a new sheriff, I only dropped the monthly observations before the sheriff
left office up through after the appointed sheriff took office.
A summary of the elections in my sample is shown in Figure 1.2 and
Table 1.2. Overall, there are 618 elections in my sample. In about 77% of the
elections, the sheriff in office runs in the election—there is an incumbent running.
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And the sheriff is re-elected in about 68% of the elections. The incumbent loses
in either the primary or the general in about 9% of elections. Panel b of Figure
1.2 shows the distribution of the party of the sheriff in office during the election
cycle, with about 49% of sheriffs affiliating with the Republican Party and 34%
of sheriffs affiliating with the Democratic Party. About 8% of elections are in a
county that requires the sheriff elections to be nonpartisan, and I am missing the
party information for about 0.8% of the sheriffs.
Panel c of Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of primary months. For those
counties with primary elections, the primaries occur in varying months, the earli-
est being March and the latest being September. The majority of primaries take
place in May or June. Panel d shows the overwhelming majority of general elec-
tions take place in November. Tennessee holds their sheriff elections in August,
making up 18 of the 618 elections in my sample. The distinctions in primary
months and general months causes the amount of time between primaries and
generals to vary among different counties. Panel e shows the distribution of the
length of the lame duck period for the losing sheriffs in my data sample. For the
purposes of this paper, I define the “lame duck period” as the period after which
a sheriff lost an election (either the primary or the general election) until the new
sheriff takes office. Of the 60 sheriffs who lost an election, the majority (46.7%)
lost the general election—leaving two months for the lame duck period until the
new sheriff took office. For those sheriffs who lost the primary election, the av-
erage lame duck period lasted about eight months, while the longest lame duck
period lasted ten months.
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This paper focuses specifically on what is referred to here as the election
cycle. A depiction of the election cycle is shown in Figure 1.3. In the figure and
throughout, since elections occur in different months across counties, the primary
is denoted as u, while the general election is denoted as t. For the purposes of this
study, the election cycle begins five months before the primary election, or at time
period (u − 5). From this point up until the primary election, the sheriff is either
running or never running for re-election. After the primary, the running sheriff
either wins the election and continues running for office, or loses the primary
election and becomes a lame duck. After the general election, the running sheriff
either won and continues running the county office or lost the general election
and became a lame duck. Depending on the specification, the sheriffs who lost
the general and the sheriffs who lost the primary may or may not be included in
the same lame duck indicator variable after the general election. The new sheriff
then takes office two months after the general election takes place. He replaces
the previous sheriffs in three situations: 1) when the incumbent sheriff lost the
primary, 2) when the incumbent sheriff lost the general election, and 3) when the
sheriff was never running. I include up to five months after the general election in
the election cycle.
Most states also allow sheriffs to be re-elected without term limits. The
exceptions include some counties in Colorado, with varying term limits of two to
four terms, and all counties in West Virginia—limited to two terms. Each state’s
term limit laws are available from the National Sheriff’s Association. For those
counties with term limits, I was able to sift through previous election results, cal-
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culating how many terms the sheriff had served, ascertaining if the previous sheriff
was forced out of office by term limit. While there may be a difference in sher-
iffs who are not running in the next election because of term limits versus their
own decision to retire or not run again, there were not enough observations in my
sample, ten elections out of the 618, for meaningful inference. But their existence
should be noted.
I do not have election information for several counties for various reasons.
In some instances, the counties either did not have a website, or they just did not
have any election results on their websites. Other times, the election data did not
go back far enough to collect the name of the winner from the previous election.
I merged the arrest data with the election information for the years 2012–
2017. There were no sheriff elections in 2013, and I dropped all of the observation
in 2012 except for those where there were no elections at the end of 2012. The
final data set contains 36,971 sheriff-month observations. The majority of obser-
vations in the panel are non-election cycle observations. I assume any county in
the sample with a missing arrest observation has 0 arrests.6
Table 1.3 shows the total number of observations for each group in each
time period. Most of the observations come from the incumbent sheriffs who are
running for the upcoming election. When the incumbent sheriff wins the primary,
he is considered to be running for the general election. It should be noted that
my panel is not a balanced panel so the observations may not be the same month
6I also test specifications where I restrict the sample size to only counties with populations
below 40,000. Results were similar across specifications.
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to month. In this table, and in the expanded model, those elections without a
primary are only coded as before and after the general, so there is a slight uptick
in observations for the general election portion. However, for the base model,
the observations without primaries are coded in the “before primary” and “after
general” categories, and are excluded from the “between primary and general”
category.7
1.5 Base Model
The goal of this paper is to study the effect of the regular election cycle on sheriff
behavior. In order to capture differences in sheriff behavior, I use two approaches.
Both empirical models use the arrests by the sheriff’s office per capita, scaled by
1,000, as the outcome variable. The first model (base model) uses a simplified
version of a monthly event study with collapsed coefficients, while the second
(expanded model) expands the first model into month-by-month coefficients.
As previously noted, the office of the sheriff is one with political power.
Sheriffs tend to be in office for several terms, and oftentimes they do not have a
challenger in the election. The majority of my sample has both a primary election
and a general election. The primary election is just as important—if not more
important—as the general election, since it is often the case that an incumbent
sheriff faces a strong opponent within his party, but then is unopposed in the gen-
eral election. Given the importance of both the primary election and the general
7I tested a specification where the counties without primaries were instead included in the
“between primary and general” category, and the results were consistent.
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election and the relatively small amount of election data I have, for sheriff s in
year-month m, I build the base model with three time periods—before the pri-
mary (B), between the primary and general (M ), and after the general (A),
ysm = β0+β1(runningsm ×Bsm) + β2(runningsm ×Msm)+
β3(wongeneralsm × Asm) + β4(lostprimarysm ×Msm)+
β5(lostelectionsm × Asm) + β6(neverrunningsm ×Bsm)+
β7(neverrunningsm ×Msm) + β8(neverrunningsm × Asm)+
β9(newsheriffsm) + β10log(populationcy) + αs + τm + εsm.
(1.1)
The main outcome variable, ysm, is the sheriff office’s monthly arrests per capita,
scaled by 1,000. The variable representing before the primary, Bsm, indicates
five months before the primary election up to the primary month (exclusive) in
that county. Between the primary election and general election, Msm, includes
any observation that occurs after the primary month (inclusive) and before the
general election (exclusive). After the election, Asm, includes any observation for
that sheriff that occurs up to five months after the general election (inclusive). It
should be noted the outgoing sheriff, whether he lost the election or he was never
running, does not stay in office for five months after the election. In every state
in my sample except for Louisiana, the newly elected sheriff takes office at the
beginning of the second month after the election—most commonly the beginning
of January following a November election.
I include an indicator variable, runningsm, signalling that the sheriff cur-
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rently in office is running in the upcoming election, whether that be the primary
election or the general election—i.e. the current sheriff is an incumbent in the up-
coming election. The variable wongeneralsm indicates an incumbent sheriff who
ran for re-election and subsequently won the general election (and previously won
the primary). I also include lostprimarysm to indicate an incumbent sheriff who
lost the primary election, and lostelectionsm to indicate an incumbent sheriff who
lost either the primary or general election. I include neverrunningsm to indicate
that the sheriff currently in office was never running in the election that year.
A new sheriff takes office following either a loss or a sheriff who was never
running for office; he is indicated by (newsheriff)sm. The new sheriff variable is
only indicated after the new sheriff takes office, two months after the general
election up until five months after the general election. Each type of sheriff is in-
teracted with the different time periods. I am careful to only include the winning
and losing indicators after the election is over to avoid any reverse causation ef-
fects. I also include log(populationcy), but the estimated population data are only
at the year y level for the county c. Sheriff fixed effects are included as αs, and
year-month fixed effects are included as τm. The error term is εsm.
1.5.1 Results
Results for the base model are shown in Table 1.4. Estimated by (1.1), the coeffi-
cients with standard error bars for each group in each time period are depicted in
Figure 1.4. Figure 1.4 corresponds to Specification 1 in Table 1.4. Specifications
1 and 2 use the full data sample, while Specifications 3 and 4 exclude any obser-
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vations with 0 arrests per capita. The comparison group for every coefficient is the
sheriff’s office not during an election year. Results across all four specifications
are fairly robust. A few of the coefficients (e.g. Ran and Lost Primary and Ran
and Lost Election) are slightly larger when excluding the 0’s. Every coefficient
is negative, indicating that, typically, sheriffs make fewer arrests during election
years compared to non-election years. This can be seen visually in Figure 1.4.
This result is consistent with the results by Hill & Zoorob (n.d.), who find that ar-
rests are down during election years. A few introductory specifications are given
in Appendix Table A1. They are all consistent with the base model results.
Looking at Specification 1 in Table 1.4, before the primary election, the av-
erage running sheriff makes a statistically significant 0.08 fewer arrests per 1,000
capita, and between the two elections, the sheriffs who are running for re-election
make a statistically significant 0.17 fewer arrests per 1,000 capita than sheriffs
outside the election cycle. After the general election, the sheriffs who won make
a statistically significant 0.12 fewer arrests per 1,000 capita compared to non-
election years.
Following a loss in the primary election, the sheriff’s office makes roughly
a statistically significant 0.19 fewer arrests per 1,000 capita between the two elec-
tions. The average arrests per 1,000 capita in the monthly time frame is about 1.85.
So, for the average month, the sheriff’s office is making about 10.3% fewer arrests
following a lost primary. Keep in mind the average sheriff that lost a primary had
a lame duck period of eight months, so that is a 0.19 decrease in arrests per 1,000
capita over an average of eight months, sometimes up to ten months. This drop
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does not appear to be statistically different than the effects for the sheriffs who
are still running and the sheriffs who were never running in that time period. The
biggest decline in arrests per capita comes from losers after the general election.
Sheriffs who lost either the primary or the general election made a statistically
significant 0.36 fewer arrests per 1,000 capita following the general election. This
effect does appear to be statistically stronger than the other two groups in that time
period (those who won the general election and those who were never running).
For the average month (mean 1.85 arrests per 1,000 capita), the sheriff’s office
makes about 19.5% fewer arrests per capita. Since the elections take place within
the first week of the election month, the election months themselves are included
in the “after election” time period. Therefore, the decline of 0.36 arrests per 1,000
capita following the general election exists for two months.
Sheriffs who are never running for re-election during the election cycle
have varying results. I would not expect to see a decline in arrests until closer
to the end of their term, but the average sheriff who is never running makes a
statistically significant decline in arrests per 1,000 capita of about 0.22 in the five-
month time period before the primary election. Then between the two elections
and after the general election, the sheriff who is never running makes a statistically
significant 0.14 and 0.15 fewer arrests per 1,000 capita, respectively.
There is also some semblance of turnover costs when the new sheriff takes
office. In his first four months, the average new sheriff makes a statistically sig-
nificant 0.26 fewer arrests per 1,000 capita, compared to the rest of his term. I
suspect this is indicative of the time necessary to adjust to the new position. The
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sign of the coefficient on log(population) is negative, but the coefficient is not
statistically significant.
1.6 Crime Stratification
I am also interested in determining which crime categories are those where sheriff
offices are making fewer arrests. I separate the crimes into drug, DUI, violent,
and property crimes. The drug and DUI categories are both arrests per 1,000
population, while the violent and property categories are arrest to incident ratios.
Results of the base model (OLS) on each independent variable are shown in Table
A6 and Figures A1, A2, A3, and A4 in the Appendix. There are also several
introductory regression results in Appendix Tables A2, A3, A4, and A5. Again,
as shown in Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1, there is a significantly larger portion of 0’s
in each of these dependent variables. Given the excess 0’s (upwards of 30%), I
use an independent double hurdle model in place of the base model. Each of the
independent variables is the same as the base model, but instead of estimating
OLS, I estimate with the first hurdle as a probit model, and then the second hurdle
as a zero-truncated model.
Results of the double hurdle model are shown in Table 1.5, with the marginal
effects from the probit model in the first half, and the marginal effects from the
truncated model in the second half. The marginal effects from the probit model
would indicate how much more or less likely the average sheriff’s office is to make
at least one arrest in each month. The effects from the truncated portion can be
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read as the linear effect for each independent variable on the dependent variable.
There are not many significant results from the probit hurdle (only two statisti-
cally significant coefficients from all four regressions). My hypothesis is that the
marginal decision to make the first arrest is comparable to any other marginal ar-
rest, thus the probability of making the first arrest would not likely be affected by
the election cycle. There are, however, several statistically significant coefficients
from the truncated portion of the model for both drug arrests per 1,000 capita and
DUI arrests per 1,000 capita.
The regression results from the truncated model are in Part II of Table 1.5.
The coefficients are also depicted graphically for each crime category in Figures
1.5, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8. Looking at Specification 1 in Part II of Table 1.5, there seems
to be an unexpected positive effect for the sheriffs who won the general election
after the election. The average winning sheriff makes about 0.05 more drug arrests
per 1,000 capita following an election win. There is also a statistically significant
effect when the running sheriff loses one of the elections in the time period after
the general. The average losing sheriff makes about 0.23 fewer drug arrests per
1,000 capita after the general election. The standard deviation for the truncated
portion of the drug variable is 0.46. So, the effect of the sheriff election loss is half
a standard deviation. This is a relatively large effect, especially since it persists
for usually two months. This result can also be seen in Figure 1.5, as the bar
extending the farthest below 0. It appears the decline in arrests from an election
loss shown in the base model in Table 1.4 is mostly from drug arrests. Drug arrests
are relatively discretionary compared to other reported crimes, such as violent
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crimes, thus it is easier to let the drug arrests decline. There are also statistically
significant negative results for drug arrests for the never-running sheriffs. Never-
running sheriffs make about 0.06 and 0.15 fewer drug arrests per 1,000 capita both
before the primary election and between the two elections.
Specification 2 in Part II of Table 1.5 shows results from another rela-
tively discretionary type of crime, DUI’s. These results can also be seen in Figure
1.6. Before both the primary and the general elections, the average running sher-
iff tends to make a statistically significant 0.02 and 0.05 more DUI arrests per
1,000 capita, respectively. Though relatively small, (the standard deviation of the
DUI variable is 0.32), these positive effects could be indicating that getting drunk
drivers off the road is important to voters. There also tends to be a subsequent
decline in DUI arrests per 1,000 capita following an election win. Interestingly,
sheriffs who were never running tend to have an office that makes about a statisti-
cally significant 0.13 more DUI arrests per 1,000 capita between the two elections,
but make about 0.09 fewer DUI arrests per 1,000 capita after the general election.
There is also a small, negative, statistically significant effect for the new sheriffs
making DUI arrests.
None of the election variables are statistically significant for the violent and
property arrest to incident ratio specifications. The violent and property specifica-
tions are presented graphically in Figures 1.7 and 1.8. These results are consistent
with those of Hill & Zoorob (n.d.), who found that the crime categories that were
most affected by elections were the discretionary crimes, and the violent crimes
were unaffected. The only variable that was statistically significant for the prop-
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erty arrest specification was the log of the population.
Population appears to be a significant factor for all crime specifications ex-
cept violent crimes. The effect is the largest for the drug arrests, where increasing
the population by 10% leads to a decrease of about 0.19 drug arrests per 1,000
capita. The DUI and property specifications also have negative results, but the
magnitude of the coefficients is much smaller.
1.7 Expanded Model
For the second model, I extend the coefficients in the base model to month-by-
month coefficients to confirm the base model results. I estimate





























β9log(populationcy) + αs + τm + εsm,
(1.2)
where the only outcome variable ysm is arrests per capita, scaled by 1,000, for
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sheriff s in year-month m. The variables u and t denote the primary and the
general election months, respectively, and i denotes the number of months before
or after that election. For example, (t − 3) is an indicator variable indicating
that the observation is three months before the general election. The remaining
variables are as previously described. Note the lostelection and neverrunning
variables are only included up to one month after the general election. There are
not enough observations from Louisiana to include up to five months after the
general election. In this model, of those who lost an election, I only include those
who lost the general election after the general election as lostgeneral.
Since the amount of time between the primary and the general election
varies, there is a question of how many months to include after the primary and
before the general. I settled on three-month windows for both, after having con-
sidered the overlap between the two elections. If, for example, one county only
has five months between the primary and the general election, all five-month in-
dicators after the primary would overlap with the five-month indicators before the
general election. Using a window of three months, only the middle month over-
laps in this example. Also in an effort to minimize overlap, I test specifications
with varying numbers of months for winning sheriffs following primaries. The
sheriffs who won the primaries are the same sheriffs as those who are running in
the general election, so I look to minimize that overlap as well.
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1.7.1 Results
Specification 1 in Table 1.6 shows the results from (1.2) and is depicted in Figure
1.9. Like the results from the base model, Specifications 1 and 2 include the
full data sample, while Specifications 3 and 4 exclude the 0’s in the dependent
variable. The comparison group is still the sheriff’s office not during an election
year.
The results compare well to the base model results. Not every month is
statistically significant, but before the primary, for the two coefficients that are sta-
tistically significant, the sheriffs who are running make between 0.10–0.13 fewer
arrests per 1,000 capita, slightly larger than the base model’s estimate of 0.08.
The sheriffs who lost the primary have an unexpected positive coefficient
in the month of the primary. Looking at Figure 1.9, they have a slightly positive
coefficient in the month of the primary and then decline through the three months
after the primary. However, of those coefficients for those who lost the primary,
only the coefficient for three months after the primary is statistically significant.
In that month, the average sheriff is expected to make 0.17 fewer arrests per 1,000
capita. This coefficient is slightly smaller than that of the base model. Again, that
drop could persist until two months after the general election.
Including only the statistically significant coefficients, the sheriffs who
are still running after the primary tend to make about 0.13–0.15 fewer arrests
per 1,000 capita in the months before the general election. These coefficients
are slightly less than the base model counterpart of 0.17. After having won the
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general election, the sheriffs also tend to make somewhere between 0.13–0.17
fewer arrests per 1,000 capita. When they have lost, however, sheriffs make 0.50
fewer arrests per 1,000 capita in the month of the general election, and 0.62 fewer
in their last month in office. Given a standard deviation of 1.88, the decline is a
third of a standard deviation in the last month in office. These results are almost
twice the magnitude of the base model results.
The results for the never-running sheriffs vary. Looking at Figure 1.9, the
never-running sheriffs see large decreases in arrests at the beginning of the elec-
tion cycle, statistically significant until the primary election. Then they level out
between the primary and general elections. I suspect this is partially because of
the aforementioned overlap between the months after the primary and the months
before the general election. Then in the month of the general election, the never-
running sheriff sees about 0.16 fewer arrests per 1,000 people, presumably be-
cause he is nearing the end of his term. The last month, however, is unexpectedly
not statistically significant.
Tracking well with the base model coefficient of 0.26, the new sheriff, after
he takes office, starts with a statistically significant 0.30 fewer arrests per 1,000
capita, and then for the most part trends upward to 0.25 fewer in the fifth month
after the election (his fourth month in office). Again, I suspect this is likely in part
due to turnover costs as it takes some time for the new sheriff to adjust to his new
position. The coefficient on log(population) is also almost identical to the base
model.
28
1.8 Party Affiliation Extension
Using the base model, I extend the variables into three groups: Republicans,
Democrats, and all other party affiliations. Included in the “other” category are in-
dependents, counties who hold non-partisan elections, and those for whom I could
not find a party affiliation. The distribution among these groups is shown in Panel
b of Figure 1.2. For this extension, I estimate the same equation as the base model,
except including interactions of each variable with indicators for both the Repub-
licans and the Democrats, leaving the “other” category and non-election counties
as the comparison group. The second specification I show includes only the ob-
servations with Republican and Democratic sheriffs, omitting the observations in
the “other” party category.
Results from the party affiliation estimation are shown in Table 1.7. Col-
umn 1 includes all observations, while Column 2 only includes the observations
for Republican and Democratic sheriffs. Coefficients from Specification 1 are
depicted in a graph in Figure 1.10 with standard error bars. The first thing to no-
tice is that more of the Republican coefficients are statistically significant than the
Democratic coefficients. The effects from the Republican sheriffs also tend to be
larger in most cases than those of the Democratic sheriffs, though not statistically
significantly different. It is easier to see this difference in Figure 1.10. However,
after the general election, the effects from the losing Democrats and the never-
running Democrats appear slightly larger than the effects for the Republicans in
the same categories. Overall, it appears the Republican sheriffs may be impacted
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slightly more strongly by the election cycle than Democrats, towards the begin-
ning of the cycle, while Democrats appear slightly more impacted near the end of
the cycle.
1.9 Conclusions
This paper tests the effects of the election cycle on sheriff behavior using monthly
arrest data and yearly election data between 2013–2016. Results were similar
across both the base model and the expanded model, showing an overall decline
in arrests during the election cycle and indicating some of the costs of election in
the sheriff’s office. More specifically, there is a decline in arrests per capita before
the primary election for sheriffs running for re-election. This could support the
theory that they take time away from their job responsibilities to campaign for
the election. Interestingly, there also tends to be a slight increase in DUI arrests
for those running before the elections, possibly indicating that drunk driving is an
important issue for voters.
Both models also show that the losers of both the primary and general
election decrease arrests following the lost election, though the results for those
who lose the general are more solidified by the expanded model. Losing sheriffs
after the primary make about 0.19 fewer arrests per 1,000 capita in each month
since the time they lost the election. On average, this large drop off in arrests
could last eight months before the new sheriff takes office, though it could be up
to ten months. Though the amount of time spent as a lame duck is shorter for
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sheriffs who lose the general election, the magnitude of the drop off in arrests
is larger. Sheriffs who lose the general election make an average of about 0.50
fewer arrests per 1,000 capita in the month of the election, and about 0.62 fewer
the month after the election. The decline in arrests for those who lost the general
election appears to come mostly from drug arrests. Whether the sheriff lets arrests
fall because he lacks a desire to attend to his responsibilities or the election causes
them to decrease for another reason, sheriff productivity is at risk. The decrease
in arrests could be an indication that the sheriff’s office has put less effort into
getting criminals off the streets and shirked its responsibilities, showing the high
costs of elections for the sheriff’s office.
Results for sheriffs not running for re-election are more mixed, as they
make fewer arrests before the primary, but between the two elections, they in-
crease arrests again. In their last lame duck months after the general election,
however, they do decrease arrests again, similar to the losing sheriffs. The decline,
though, is much less, about 0.15 arrests per 1,000 capita. This drop in arrests is
also likely a sign of shirking, but by sheriffs who were never-running instead of
sheriffs who lost an election.
I also find evidence of turnover costs from the new sheriffs. Over their first
four months in office, the average sheriff makes about 0.26 fewer arrests per 1,000
capita compared to the rest of his term. While not necessarily directly associated
with the elections (turnovers could occur for any newly sworn-in officer), these
turnover costs also show lower sheriff productivity at the start of a term.
Results towards the beginning of the election cycle seem to be stronger
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(more of them are statistically significant) and only slightly larger for Republi-
cans than for Democrats (not statistically significantly different). As Republicans
are known to be tougher on crime, I find this result unexpected. I would expect
the Republican sheriffs to be increasing arrests before elections in an effort to at-
tract voters through the Republican Platform. It appears, though, that Republican
sheriffs decrease arrests even more so than Democrats, albeit only slightly. How-
ever, the roles are reversed toward the end of the election cycle. The Democrats
appear of have slightly larger coefficients after the general election, though again
not statistically different than Republicans.
My research could be extended in the future in a number of ways. The loss
of an election could be used as an instrument of effort levels in a sheriff’s office.
Given the extreme decline in arrests following an election loss, it is plausible
to expect there may be some ramifications. For example, crime incidents may
increase, as criminals may see the sheriffs putting in less effort.
There is also work to be done examining differences across stratified popu-
lations. In smaller counties, sheriffs are the only law enforcement presence, while
in larger counties with cities, the sheriffs have fewer law enforcement responsi-
bilities. It is not unreasonable to think there may be differences in effects of a
decrease in effort following an election loss in counties with different population
levels.
Another future research possibility would include adding asset forfeiture
laws. Varying effects could be identified based on the allowance of forfeited asset
revenues being returned to the sheriff’s office. An office in a state allowing them
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to retain 100% of revenues from forfeited assets may show a different effect from
decreased effort by sheriff’s offices than an office in a state where they are allowed
to retain 0% of revenues from forfeited assets.
These are just a few examples of possible future research. If election re-
sults prove a viable indicator of policing effort in sheriff’s offices, there can be a



















































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2: Election Summary Statistics (n = 618)
Statistic Mean St. Dev.
Incumbent Running 0.7735 0.4189
Incumbent Won Primary and General 0.6764 0.4682
Incumbent Won Primary and Lost General 0.0453 0.2081
Incumbent Lost Primary 0.0518 0.2218






























































































































































































































































































































Table 1.4: Base Model - Arrests per Capita
Dependent variable:
Arr/Cap asinh(Arr/Cap) Arr/Cap asinh(Arr/Cap)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Running)×(B) −0.0805∗ −0.0456∗∗∗ −0.0877∗∗ −0.0480∗∗∗
(0.041 8) (0.015 6) (0.042 8) (0.014 7)
(Running)×(M) −0.1743∗∗∗ −0.0655∗∗∗ −0.1861∗∗∗ −0.0692∗∗∗
(0.048 3) (0.018 5) (0.047 1) (0.016 9)
(Ran and Won General)×(A) −0.1210∗∗∗ −0.0421∗∗∗ −0.1338∗∗∗ −0.0469∗∗∗
(0.040 3) (0.014 8) (0.041 6) (0.014 4)
(Ran and Lost Primary)×(M) −0.1902∗∗ −0.0661 −0.2382∗∗∗ −0.0961∗∗
(0.077 8) (0.040 8) (0.084 8) (0.042 5)
(Ran and Lost Election)×(A) −0.3614∗∗∗ −0.1754∗∗∗ −0.3971∗∗∗ −0.1943∗∗∗
(0.114 9) (0.046 2) (0.119 4) (0.045 3)
(Never Running)×(B) −0.2185∗∗∗ −0.0818∗∗∗ −0.2243∗∗∗ −0.0834∗∗∗
(0.057 7) (0.021 5) (0.059 9) (0.021 2)
(Never Running)×(M) −0.1414∗∗ −0.0388 −0.1686∗∗ −0.0547∗∗
(0.068 4) (0.026 2) (0.071 0) (0.025 7)
(Never Running)×(A) −0.1547∗∗ −0.0747∗∗ −0.1374∗∗ −0.0635∗∗
(0.073 5) (0.030 5) (0.068 7) (0.026 0)
(New Sheriff) −0.2552∗∗∗ −0.0888∗∗∗ −0.2536∗∗∗ −0.0835∗∗∗
(0.050 6) (0.020 3) (0.051 0) (0.018 5)
log(Population) −1.0107 −0.2908 −1.5979∗ −0.6072∗∗
(0.751 4) (0.247 9) (0.853 3) (0.252 0)
Constant 10.4764 3.3163 16.3427∗ 6.4803∗∗∗
(7.496 5) (2.472 9) (8.512 8) (2.514 3)
Month/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sheriff FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered By: Sher. Sher. Sher. Sher.
Observations 36,971 36,971 34,938 34,938
Adjusted R2 0.7469 0.7511 0.7499 0.7604
Notes: This table shows regression results from the base model, (1.1). The variable B is an indicator for up to
five months before the primary, M is an indicator for between the primary and the general, and A is an indicator
for up to five months after the general election. Significance is denoted at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level by ***, **,
and *. Standard errors are robust and clustered by sheriff.
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Table 1.5: Stratified Crime - Hurdle Models
Part I: Probit
Dependent Variable:
Drug DUI Viol A/I Prop A/I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Running)×(B) −0.0039 −0.0058 −0.0016 0.0083
(0.007 1) (0.009 4) (0.011 4) (0.009 1)
(Running)×(M) −0.0044 −0.0093 −0.0392∗∗∗ −0.0018
(0.007 8) (0.010 3) (0.014 0) (0.009 4)
(Ran and Won General)×(A) −0.0098 0.0013 −0.0022 −0.0137
(0.007 4) (0.008 8) (0.010 8) (0.008 6)
(Ran and Lost Primary)×(M) −0.0104 0.0157 0.0272 −0.0625
(0.027 9) (0.028 5) (0.028 8) (0.038 4)
(Ran and Lost General)×(A) −0.0280 0.0203 −0.0145 −0.0350
(0.037 1) (0.024 6) (0.057 7) (0.042 1)
(Never Running)×(B) −0.0079 −0.0008 0.0075 0.0098
(0.010 8) (0.014 0) (0.020 3) (0.012 6)
(Never Running)×(M) −0.0131 −0.0111 −0.0030 0.0047
(0.014 3) (0.020 6) (0.024 5) (0.016 6)
(Never Running)×(A) −0.0038 −0.0133 −0.0372 0.0094
(0.016 2) (0.026 4) (0.034 9) (0.019 3)
(New Sheriff) −0.0256∗ −0.0117 0.0284 0.0195
(0.013 9) (0.017 5) (0.018 0) (0.012 5)
log(Population) 0.0830 −0.0511 −0.0291 0.1307
(0.085 3) (0.124 7) (0.157 2) (0.115 1)
Month/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sheriff FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 36,971 36,971 21,217 33,026
Part II: Zero-Truncated
Dependent Variable:
Drug DUI Viol A/I Prop A/I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Running)×(B) 0.0195 0.0237∗ −0.0022 0.0021
(0.021 6) (0.012 2) (0.009 4) (0.005 9)
(Running)×(M) −0.0326 0.0526∗∗∗ −0.0134 0.0061
(0.023 3) (0.012 6) (0.010 3) (0.006 5)




Drug DUI Viol A/I Prop A/I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Ran and Won General)×(A) 0.0516∗∗∗ −0.0256∗∗ −0.0119 0.0068
(0.019 4) (0.012 0) (0.008 6) (0.005 3)
(Ran and Lost Primary)×(M) −0.0683 0.0068 −0.0158 −0.0047
(0.070 1) (0.046 1) (0.027 6) (0.020 8)
(Ran and Lost General)×(A) −0.2284∗∗∗ −0.0728 −0.0035 0.0341
(0.088 4) (0.050 3) (0.036 2) (0.022 8)
(Never Running)×(B) −0.0596∗ 0.0295 −0.0093 0.0077
(0.035 8) (0.018 3) (0.015 1) (0.009 3)
(Never Running)×(M) −0.1509∗∗∗ 0.1279∗∗∗ −0.0100 −0.0011
(0.040 6) (0.019 0) (0.017 0) (0.011 0)
(Never Running)×(A) 0.0180 −0.0878∗∗∗ −0.0321 −0.0116
(0.055 6) (0.032 3) (0.024 2) (0.014 8)
(New Sheriff) −0.0305 −0.0346∗ 0.0127 0.0118
(0.032 7) (0.019 6) (0.015 2) (0.009 2)
log(Population) −1.1925∗∗∗ −0.4883∗∗∗ −0.1712 −0.1490∗
(0.199 2) (0.119 7) (0.116 6) (0.080 4)
Month/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sheriff FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,384 25,865 15,410 21,120
Log-Likelihood 7,481.2 14,884 2,630.6 20,675
Notes: This table shows the results from the hurdle model for stratified crime types. Both the
Drug and DUI specifications are arrests per 1000 population, while the arrest to incident ratio
is denoted by A/I. The variable B is an indicator for up to five months before the primary, M
is an indicator for between the primary and the general, and A is an indicator for up to five
months after the general election. Significance is denoted at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level by
***, **, and *. Standard errors are robust and clustered by sheriff.
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Table 1.6: Expanded Model - Arrests per Capita
Dependent variable:
Arr/Cap asinh(Arr/Cap) Arr/Cap asinh(Arr/Cap)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(u-5)×(Running) −0.1292∗∗∗ −0.0616∗∗∗ −0.1245∗∗∗ −0.0517∗∗∗
(0.045 6) (0.019 4) (0.048 2) (0.018 0)
(u-4)×(Running) −0.0584 −0.0440∗∗ −0.0517 −0.0366∗
(0.045 0) (0.019 3) (0.045 9) (0.018 9)
(u-3)×(Running) −0.0619 −0.0386∗∗ −0.0617 −0.0365∗
(0.051 5) (0.019 4) (0.054 1) (0.018 9)
(u-2)×(Running) −0.1002∗ −0.0417∗∗ −0.1242∗∗ −0.0551∗∗∗
(0.053 7) (0.019 6) (0.056 0) (0.018 3)
(u-1)×(Running) 0.0100 −0.0237 −0.0039 −0.0362∗
(0.089 9) (0.021 2) (0.092 8) (0.019 5)
(u)×(Lost Primary) 0.0492 0.0484 0.0166 0.0233
(0.124 8) (0.059 5) (0.128 9) (0.059 7)
(u+1)×(Lost Primary) −0.1173 −0.0466 −0.1603 −0.0736
(0.096 1) (0.056 1) (0.103 9) (0.059 1)
(u+2)×(Lost Primary) −0.1464 −0.0544 −0.1892 −0.0841
(0.107 8) (0.052 2) (0.115 3) (0.054 7)
(u+3)×(Lost Primary) −0.1693∗ −0.0657 −0.2157∗∗ −0.0932∗
(0.089 1) (0.050 9) (0.095 8) (0.053 4)
(t-3)×(Running) −0.1504∗∗ −0.0539∗∗ −0.1532∗∗ −0.0555∗∗
(0.065 4) (0.025 1) (0.060 7) (0.022 2)
(t-2)×(Running) −0.0856 −0.0398∗ −0.0755 −0.0267
(0.056 1) (0.023 2) (0.055 7) (0.021 4)
(t-1)×(Running) −0.1268∗ −0.0379∗ −0.1519∗∗ −0.0464∗∗
(0.074 8) (0.022 5) (0.077 0) (0.021 2)
(t)×(Won General) −0.1376∗∗∗ −0.0523∗∗ −0.1483∗∗∗ −0.0536∗∗∗
(0.051 7) (0.020 5) (0.053 2) (0.020 1)
(t+1)×(Won General) −0.0760 −0.0277 −0.1020∗∗ −0.0392∗∗
(0.050 1) (0.020 3) (0.051 8) (0.019 7)
(t+2)×(Won General) −0.1723∗∗∗ −0.0504∗∗ −0.1905∗∗∗ −0.0602∗∗∗
(0.055 4) (0.020 1) (0.056 0) (0.019 1)
(t+3)×(Won General) −0.1281∗∗ −0.0345∗ −0.1345∗∗ −0.0344
(0.055 6) (0.021 0) (0.057 8) (0.020 9)
cont. on next page
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Dependent variable:
Arr/Cap asinh(Arr/Cap) Arr/Cap asinh(Arr/Cap)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(t+4)×(Won General) −0.1346∗ −0.0594∗∗∗ −0.1477∗∗ −0.0665∗∗∗
(0.068 7) (0.021 3) (0.070 4) (0.020 4)
(t+5)×(Won General) −0.0562 −0.0167 −0.0516 −0.0119
(0.056 9) (0.020 6) (0.059 3) (0.020 4)
(t)×(Lost General) −0.5015∗∗ −0.1956∗ −0.5282∗∗ −0.2031∗∗
(0.255 5) (0.106 9) (0.237 9) (0.088 8)
(t+1)×(Lost General) −0.6242∗∗∗ −0.3037∗∗∗ −0.5981∗∗ −0.2826∗∗∗
(0.221 8) (0.085 0) (0.233 8) (0.080 4)
(u-5)×(Never Running) −0.2042∗∗ −0.0593∗∗ −0.2419∗∗∗ −0.0861∗∗∗
(0.071 6) (0.029 0) (0.075 1) (0.029 8)
(u-4)×(Never Running) −0.2796∗∗∗ −0.1139∗∗∗ −0.2730∗∗∗ −0.1064∗∗∗
(0.081 0) (0.034 6) (0.083 9) (0.034 6)
(u-3)×(never running) −0.2538∗∗∗ −0.1038∗∗∗ −0.2600∗∗∗ −0.1048∗∗∗
(0.081 4) (0.031 5) (0.086 3) (0.031 6)
(u-2)×(never running) −0.1951∗∗∗ −0.0865∗∗ −0.1859∗∗ −0.0767∗∗
(0.074 6) (0.033 6) (0.076 4) (0.030 6)
(u-1)×(Never Running) −0.1804∗∗ −0.0517 −0.1922∗∗ −0.0569
(0.088 8) (0.036 6) (0.091 7) (0.034 8)
(u)×(Never Running) −0.0189 −0.0015 −0.0556 −0.0265
(0.095 1) (0.033 1) (0.099 9) (0.033 9)
(u+1)×(Never Running) −0.0859 −0.0241 −0.0884 −0.0259
(0.089 9) (0.035 3) (0.092 4) (0.034 0)
(u+2)×(Never Running) −0.0939 −0.0335 −0.1185∗ −0.0519∗
(0.065 6) (0.029 1) (0.067 4) (0.028 5)
(u+3)×(Never Running) −0.0550 −0.0143 −0.1140 −0.0571∗∗
(0.070 1) (0.028 1) (0.077 0) (0.028 6)
(t-3)×(Never Running) −0.1712∗∗ −0.0581∗∗ −0.1712∗∗ −0.0541∗
(0.070 0) (0.029 4) (0.072 5) (0.029 4)
(t-2)×(Never Running) −0.0731 −0.0278 −0.0690 −0.0208
(0.072 8) (0.032 1) (0.072 6) (0.030 1)
(t-1)×(Never Running) −0.0733 −0.0029 −0.0901 −0.0086
(0.087 6) (0.032 5) (0.090 6) (0.032 1)
(t)×(Never Running) −0.1627∗∗ −0.0801∗∗ −0.0962 −0.0324
cont. on next page
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Dependent variable:
Arr/Cap asinh(Arr/Cap) Arr/Cap asinh(Arr/Cap)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(0.079 4) (0.034 6) (0.075 3) (0.029 6)
(t+1)×(Never Running) −0.1189 −0.0610∗ −0.1378∗ −0.0758∗∗
(0.079 6) (0.033 9) (0.080 2) (0.031 4)
(t+2)×(New Sheriff) −0.3048∗∗∗ −0.1100∗∗∗ −0.3152∗∗∗ −0.1125∗∗∗
(0.065 6) (0.026 1) (0.065 9) (0.024 6)
(t+3)×(New Sheriff) −0.2605∗∗∗ −0.0959∗∗∗ −0.2521∗∗∗ −0.0821∗∗∗
(0.076 1) (0.030 1) (0.078 4) (0.027 9)
(t+4)×(New Sheriff) −0.2340∗∗∗ −0.0764∗∗∗ −0.2359∗∗∗ −0.0728∗∗∗
(0.068 5) (0.026 8) (0.069 5) (0.025 7)
(t+5)×(New Sheriff) −0.2453∗∗∗ −0.0794∗∗∗ −0.2344∗∗∗ −0.0728∗∗∗
(0.061 7) (0.026 4) (0.062 8) (0.024 1)
log(Population) −1.0674 −0.3139 −1.6732∗ −0.6382∗∗
(0.757 9) (0.251 5) (0.854 3) (0.252 6)
Constant 11.0541 3.5497 17.1062∗∗ 6.7929∗∗∗
(7.560 3) (2.508 2) (8.522 4) (2.519 8)
Month/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sheriff FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered By: Sher. Sher. Sher. Sher.
Observations 36,971 36,971 34,938 34,938
Adjusted R2 0.7466 0.7508 0.7495 0.7600
Notes: This table shows the results from the expanded model, (1.2). The primary is indicated by (u),
and the general is indicated by (t), and each interval is a one month time period. In each specification,
the dependent variable is Arrests per Capita. Significance is denoted at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level by
***, **, and *. Standard errors are robust and clustered by sheriff.
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(0.029 4) (0.030 2)
(Rep)×(Running)×(M) −0.1214∗∗∗ −0.1224∗∗∗
(0.034 5) (0.035 6)
(Rep)×(Ran and Won General)×(A) −0.1067∗∗∗ −0.1239∗∗∗
(0.032 5) (0.033 2)
(Rep)×(Ran and Lost Primary)×(M) −0.1216 −0.1276
(0.112 2) (0.113 0)
(Rep)×(Ran and Lost Election)×(A) −0.1645 −0.1783
(0.124 4) (0.124 3)
(Rep)×(Never Running)×(B) −0.1063∗∗∗ −0.1111∗∗∗
(0.038 2) (0.039 0)
(Rep)×(Never Running)×(M) −0.0556 −0.0641
(0.054 6) (0.055 9)
(Rep)×(Never Running)×(A) −0.0600 −0.0765
(0.049 2) (0.050 3)
(Dem)×(Running)×(B) −0.0269 −0.0280
(0.034 2) (0.035 6)
(Dem)×(Running)×(M) −0.0801∗∗ −0.0831∗∗
(0.037 4) (0.038 8)
(Dem)×(Ran and Won General)×(A) −0.0215 −0.0349
(0.035 1) (0.036 0)
(Dem)×(Ran and Lost Primary)×(M) −0.0504 −0.0591
(0.092 0) (0.092 7)
(Dem)×(Ran and Lost Election)×(A) −0.2758∗∗∗ −0.2929∗∗∗
(0.094 6) (0.095 0)
(Dem)×(Never Running)×(B) −0.0784∗ −0.0848∗
(0.045 6) (0.046 3)
(Dem)×(Never Running)×(M) −0.0281 −0.0372
(0.051 7) (0.052 8)
(Dem)×(Never Running)×(A) −0.1272∗∗ −0.1445∗∗





(0.063 0) (0.063 6)
(Rep)×(New Sheriff) −0.0815∗∗ −0.0856∗∗
(0.035 4) (0.037 1)
(Dem)×(New Sheriff) −0.0842∗ −0.0866∗
(0.047 1) (0.047 9)
(Rep) −0.1209 −0.4406




(0.287 4) (0.538 1)
Constant 5.2584∗ 6.9075
(2.887 3) (5.368 9)
Month/Year FE Yes Yes
Sheriff FE Yes Yes
Clustered By: Sher. Sher.
Observations 36,971 29,975
Adjusted R2 0.6848 0.6995
Notes: This table shows the results of the base model, adding interactions
for both the Republican (Rep) and Democratic (Dem) parties. The letters
B, M, and A stand for the three different time periods, before the primary
(B), between the primary and general (M), and after the general (A). (New
Sheriff) is only indicated for his first four months in office. Specification 1
includes all observations, and Specification 2 only includes the observations
with a Republican or Democratic sheriff. Significance is denoted at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level by ***, **, and *. Standard errors are robust and
clustered by sheriff.
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Figure 1.1: Histograms of Dependent Variables
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Figure 1.2: Pie Charts Representing Election Data
Notes: a: Each portion represents the percentage of elections in my data sample taking place in
each year. b: Each portion represents the percentage of elections in my sample where the sheriff
affiliates with the indicated party. c: Each portion represents the percentage of elections in my
sample with primaries in each month. d: Each portion represents the percentage of elections in my
sample with generals in each month. e: Each portion represents the number of months each losing
sheriff in my sample spent as a lame duck.
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Figure 1.3: Election Cycle Timeline
Notes: This figure depicts sheriffs during each time period in the election cycle. The primary
election is in month (u), and the general election takes place in month (t). Each numerical unit
is one month. In some specifications, those who lost the general election and lost the primary
are included as the same indicator variable after the general election, as they would both be lame
ducks with similar incentives.
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Figure 1.4: Base Model Coefficients
Notes: This figure shows the regression coefficients from the base model, (1.1), with standard
error bars. The dependent variable is Arrests per Capita, and each section depicts a different time
period for each variable. Standard error bars are robust and clustered by sheriff.
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Figure 1.5: Hurdle Model Coefficients: Drug Arrests
Notes: This figure shows the regression coefficients from the truncated regression portion of the
hurdle model for drug arrests, with standard error bars. The dependent variable is Drug Arrests
per Capita, and each section depicts a different time period for each variable.
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Figure 1.6: Hurdle Model Coefficients: DUI Arrests
Notes: This figure shows the regression coefficients from the truncated regression portion of the
hurdle model for DUI arrests, with standard error bars. The dependent variable is DUI Arrests per
Capita, and each section depicts a different time period for each variable.
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Figure 1.7: Hurdle Model Coefficients: Violent Arrests
Notes: This figure shows the regression coefficients from the truncated regression portion of the
hurdle model for violent arrests, with standard error bars. The dependent variable is the Violent
Arrest to Incident Ratio, and each section depicts a different time period for each variable.
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Figure 1.8: Hurdle Model Coefficients: Property Arrests
Notes: This figure shows the regression coefficients from the truncated regression portion of the
hurdle model for property arrests, with standard error bars. The dependent variable is the Property
































































































































































Figure 1.10: Base Model Coefficients: Party Extension
Notes: This figure shows the regression coefficients from the party affiliation extension with stan-
dard error bars. Coefficients correspond with Column 1 in Table 1.7. Standard errors are robust
and clustered by sheriff.
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CHAPTER 2
EFFICIENCY FORFEITED: A FRONTIER ANALYSIS OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND REVENUE GENERATION
2.1 Introduction
One criticism of asset forfeiture is that forfeiture laws provide law enforcement
agencies with the incentive to change police behavior in a way that generates more
revenue for the agency. Any type of property, cash, etc. believed to be connected
to an illegal activity can be taken away by a law enforcement officer, i.e. seized.
Individuals have the right to contest seizures in a trial process, though the majority
remain uncontested.1 After seizure, the value from what is not destroyed can be
used to fund drug education programs, school budgets, health departments, etc.
(Williams, 2002; Holcomb et al., 2011). In a majority of states, some or all of
the proceeds are allowed to be returned to the law enforcement agencies and used
by the department, resulting in the “policing for profit” argument (Blumenson &
Nilsen, 1998; Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008; Holcomb et al., 2011; Makowsky et al.,
2019; Graham & Makowsky, forthcoming). Figure 2.1 shows the varying percent
allowance of retained assets through forfeiture laws across the United States (US).
Some states allow agency retention of 0 percent, while the remaining states have
retention rates between 50 percent and 100 percent. For those agencies allowed to
1See the FBI’s asset forfeiture description.
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keep the majority of the proceeds from seized assets, there is a financial incentive
to actively seek arrests for illegal activities typically resulting in seizures.
Previous literature analyzes the incentives from forfeiture laws for law
enforcement agencies to gear their efforts toward revenue generation. In times of
fiscal distress and when forfeiture laws allow the law enforcement agency to retain
funds from seized assets, arrest rates increase for blacks and Hispanics commit-
ting drug, DUI, and prostitution violations (Makowsky et al., 2019). Local deficits
compounded with the forfeiture laws affect the behavior of law enforcement of-
ficers and agencies (Makowsky et al., 2019). The behavior of law enforcement
agents is also impacted through the federal equitable sharing program. State and
local agencies have the ability to transfer forfeited assets to federal law enforce-
ment. A percentage of the federal forfeiture fund can then be returned to state
and local departments in the form of federal equitable sharing payments. Those
agencies in states with more restrictive forfeiture laws tend to collect more in
federal equitable sharing payments (Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008; Holcomb et al.,
2011, 2018). These agencies are incentivized to use the federal equitable sharing
program to maximize their revenue generation potential. Other evidence of for-
feiture laws benefitting police departments through financial incentives includes
higher police expenditures following an increase in property seizures (Benson
et al., 1995). The agencies that seize more property have more money at their dis-
posal. Similarly, Baicker & Jacobson (2007) find that local governments decrease
the allocation of funds to police departments following a period of higher prop-
erty seizures by those departments. The police departments respond by increasing
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drug arrest rates, as drug crimes are the most lucrative in terms of collecting cash
seizures.
Forfeitures are not the only legal asset police departments have at their fin-
gertips. They also use fines and fees to their monetary advantage (Garrett & Wag-
ner, 2009; Makowsky & Stratmann, 2009; Goldstein et al., 2020; Harvey, 2020).
And along with the fiscal incentives set by fines, fees, and forfeitures comes some
ancillary effects, both negative and positive. Negative effects include shifted ef-
fort from violent and property crime clearances (Goldstein et al., 2020) to drug
crimes (Mast et al., 2000; Baicker & Jacobson, 2007; Kelly & Kole, 2016), while
positive effects include fewer traffic accidents (Makowsky & Stratmann, 2011)
and safer driving (Harvey, 2020). For more information regarding fines, fees, and
forfeitures and their effects on police incentives and behaviors, see Graham &
Makowsky (forthcoming).
This paper uses non-parametric frontier analysis to estimate technical ef-
ficiency scores of law enforcement agencies at the county level. I then use a
second-stage model to test the effects of civil asset forfeiture laws on the esti-
mated efficiencies of law enforcement. Technical efficiency is defined as how
effectively departments transform a set of police production inputs into desired
police outputs, relative to other departments. Defined more precisely in Section
2.2, there are two common types of efficiency estimators used to measure law
enforcement efficiency: the free-disposal hull (FDH) (Deprins & Simar, 1984)
and data envelopment analysis (DEA) (Farrell, 1957; Banker et al., 1984) esti-
mators. Both types of estimators use a set of inputs and outputs to estimate the
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efficiency scores. Minimal work in police efficiency exists using the FDH estima-
tor. Drake & Simper (2003) compare the scores produced from the FDH estimator
with those from stochastic frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis (DEA)
estimators in English and Welsh police forces between 1996 and 1999. The DEA
estimators require the assumption of convexity of the production frontier, while
the FDH estimator is consistent under convexity or non-convexity. After Drake
& Simper (2003) published their work, Kneip et al. (2015, 2016) provided central
limit theorems and a statistic for testing convexity. Incorporating their work, I
test for convexity to assist in determining the best estimator of law enforcement
efficiency.
Research on police efficiency is much more expansive outside of the US.
Thanassoulis (1995) analyzed police forces in England and Wales, and Carrington
et al. (1997) studied the New South Wales Police Service. Sun (2002) and Wu
et al. (2010) analyzed police forces in Taiwan, while research in Spain was done
by Diez-Ticio & Mancebon (2002), Garcı́a-Sánchez (2009), and Garcı́a-Sánchez
et al. (2013). It appears Nyhan & Martin (1999) and Gorman & Ruggiero (2008)
are the only studies to examine US law enforcement using DEA. Nyhan & Martin
(1999) examine the efficiency of 20 US cities and then use population and median
income as environmental variables affecting the magnitude of the efficiency level
in each city in a second-stage estimation. They use department cost and staff
as inputs and total crimes, response time, and crime clear up rate as outputs in
their estimation. Nyhan & Martin (1999) try to show both population and income
are important environmental factors in determining the state’s police efficiency by
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introducing them into the frontier estimation as “uncontrollable” inputs.
Gorman & Ruggiero (2008) evaluate the efficiency of the 48 continental
US states and DC and use a three-stage DEA technique to examine the impact of
environmental variables for the year 2002. They first estimate the DEA scores,
and then they use standard OLS and Tobit models in the second stage to test
the effect of several environmental variables on the efficiency estimates. Their
third stage estimates a cost index. Gorman & Ruggiero (2008) use the number
of sworn officers, the number of other employees, and the number of vehicles,
while their outputs include the rate of murders, the rate of other violent crime,
and the rate of all property crime. They find that roughly 70 percent of states
are technically efficient. Their three-stage technique also leads them to believe
several environmental factors, population being the most important, are causing
the inefficiencies.
Simar & Wilson (2007) describe problems with multi-stage estimation on
efficiency estimates. Environmental variables must be separable from the pro-
duction set to obtain meaningful efficiency scores. This separability condition
requires that the true production set or frontier cannot change because of the envi-
ronmental variables. In other words, an environmental factor cannot be a reason
the production frontier moves to another location in the input-output space. Gor-
man & Ruggiero (2008) do not examine the plausibility of their assumption of
separability when they do their multi-stage estimations. Nyhan & Martin (1999)
try to use their environmental variables as “uncontrollable” inputs, further de-
creasing the power of their model with a sample size of 20. This paper tests for
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the separability condition using the test introduced by Daraio et al. (2018).
A technique for dimension reduction was introduced by Wilson (2018).
Several of the aforementioned law enforcement efficiency studies could have ben-
efitted from this technique by reducing the dimensions of the problem and reduc-
ing estimation error. This paper takes advantage of the Wilson (2018) method to
examine law enforcement efficiency.
In order to determine whether police departments capitalize on incentives
to generate revenue, I split crime incidents into two categories: crime where the
incident is reported by some victim, such as murder or theft, and crime where
the incident is not victim-reported (e.g., drug crimes, etc.). Non-victim-reported
crimes are the majority of crimes where police are able to seize property that can
potentially be used for their department. By not including the non-victim-reported
crimes in the efficiency estimation, I show that agencies are substituting away
from solving victim-reported crimes, probably in favor of the potentially lucrative
non-victim-reported crimes. The counties that are substituting away from victim-
reported crimes should have lower efficiency scores.
Because of their nature, it is more difficult to alter the rate of arrests for
victim-reported crimes, while victimless crime arrests are more easily manipu-
lated. Law enforcement officers have an incentive to increase the rate of arrests for
victimless crimes because of the potential for revenue generation. My hypothesis
is that officers exposed to higher asset retention rates spend more time generating
revenue through victimless crimes, thus decreasing the focus on victim-reported
crime. The effort put forth by law enforcement officers is scarce, and thus it is
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expected that the counties in states with a 0 percent asset forfeiture rate should
more efficiently solve incidents reported by a victim.
2.2 Methodology
The goal of this paper is to estimate the effect of civil asset forfeiture laws on
estimated law enforcement technical efficiencies. To first estimate the police effi-
ciency scores, I use non-parametric frontier analysis. Technical efficiency scores
signify how effectively a firm transforms their p inputs x ∈ IRp+ into their q out-
puts y ∈ IRq+, relative to the other firms, i.e. how close they are to the overall
production frontier.
Assume a firm’s production set
Ψ = {(x,y) | x can produce y} (2.1)
containing every feasible combination of inputs and outputs. This paper uses the
following standard assumptions about production (Shephard, 1970; Färe, 1988;
Simar & Wilson, 2000b). The production set is assumed closed, and any produc-
tion requires the use of some positive amount of inputs, i.e. (x,y) 6∈ Ψ if x =
0 and y ≥ 0, y 6= 0, where inequalities hold element by element here and
throughout. Free-disposability is also assumed for both inputs and outputs; if
(x,y) ∈ Ψ, then for any (x′,y′) such that x′ ≥ x and y′ ≤ y, (x′,y′) ∈ Ψ.
Technical efficiency of a firm is measured by the distance to the estimated
production frontier in the input-output space in one of several directions. Most
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commonly, efficiency is measured in either the horizontal input direction, or the
vertical output direction. In the input direction, the efficiency measure proportion-
ately scales all inputs to their minimum level, keeping outputs constant. Similarly,
in the output direction, the efficiency measure proportionately scales all outputs to
their maximum level, given some level of inputs. Given that police departments
in the county have their input levels predetermined by officials outside the de-
partment, I employ the output distance function. It makes more sense to ask how
police outputs can be maximized given an already chosen level of police inputs,
rather than asking how police inputs can be minimized given a fixed level of police
outputs.
The Farrell (1957) output measure of technical efficiency is defined as
θ(x,y) = sup{θ | (x, θy) ∈ Ψ}. (2.2)
Technical efficiency is achieved when θ(x,y) = 1. The firm is considered tech-
nically inefficienct when θ(x,y) > 1. This measure of technical efficiency pro-
portionately scales all outputs, holding inputs constant.
Proposed by Deprins & Simar (1984), the free-disposal hull (FDH) esti-
mator estimates the true frontier Ψ by
Ψ̂FDH(Sn) = {(x,y) ∈ IRp+q+ | y ≤ Yi, x ≥ Xi, (Xi, Yi) ∈ Sn}, (2.3)
where (Sn) = {(Xi, Yi)}ni=1 is the data sample. The FDH estimator makes no
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assumption of the convexity of Ψ. The data envelopment estimators (DEA) (Far-
rell, 1957; Banker et al., 1984), on the other hand, assume convexity of the true
frontier. Most common in the literature is the variable returns to scale (VRS) DEA
estimator, estimated by










γi = 1, γi ≥ 0 ∀i = 1, ..., n}
(2.4)
and the convex hull of Ψ̂FDH(Sn). Similarly, the constant returns to scale (CRS)
DEA estimator is estimated by (2.4), but relaxes the
∑n
i=1 γi = 1 constraint, and
is the conical hull of Ψ̂FDH(Sn). Then for any j ∈ {FDH , V RS, CRS}, the
Farrell (1957) output measure θ(x,y) is estimated with θ̂j(x,y | Sn) by replacing
Ψ in (2.2) with Ψ̂j(Sn).














and thus the convergence rate clearly depends on the number of inputs p and out-
puts q—the curse of dimensionality. In order to reduce estimation error, I use
Wilson’s (2018) method of dimension reduction. Raising the number of inputs
or outputs exacerbates bias and causes a larger number of firms to lie on the esti-
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mated frontier (Wilson, 2018). Wilson (2018) shows strong evidence for reduced
estimation error via dimension reduction in many circumstances. The reduction
technique exploits the probable multicollinearity between inputs and outputs to
decrease the dimensions by eigensystem decomposition. Though any subset of
total inputs or outputs can be reduced, in this paper the total number of police
inputs and outputs are decreased to p = q = 1. The reduced input is a weighted
average of inputs, while the reduced output is a weighted average of outputs. For
each of the inputs and the outputs, the ratio of the largest eigenvalue to the sum
of all eigenvalues for the eigenvalue decomposition of the standardized moment
matrices corresponds to the amount of linear, independent information captured





where λxk is the k
th eigenvalue from the decomposition of the moment matrix.
An RY value can be calculated similarly for the outputs. Wilson (2018) runs
several simulations to determine the trade-off between reduced estimation error
and loss of information for varying sample sizes and dimensions. His results show
dimension reduction becomes beneficial for RX and RY values in the 0.75–0.80
range for my sample sizes. Finding values above that range for bothRX andRY , I
reduce the dimensions for my sample to p = q = 1. To calculate the reduced input
and output, I use the reduce.dim() function in Wilson’s (2008) Frontier Efficiency
Analysis with R (FEAR) package in R.
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Consideration also needs to be taken for bias in efficiency estimates. Noted
in Simar & Wilson (1998) and Simar & Wilson (2000a), efficiency estimates from
DEA estimation are inherently biased, as they are estimates based on an unob-
served true frontier. Simar & Wilson (2000a) provide a general method to esti-
mate the inherent bias in DEA efficiency estimates for each observation. I use
the boot.sw98() function in Wilson’s (2008) FEAR package in R setting CI.TYPE
= 2 to use this method to calculate the bias-corrected efficiency estimates for use
in the second stage model.
2.2.1 Test for Convexity of the Production Set
Kneip et al. (2015, 2016) provide central limit theorems for inference and develop
a statistic for testing convexity of the production frontier. The test statistic de-
scribed in Kneip et al. (2016) and Simar & Wilson (2020) compares means of the
FDH estimates to the VRS estimates over N sample splits. The FDH estimator
allows for non-convexity or convexity, and is thus consistent in both cases, while
the VRS estimator is consistent only under convexity. The null hypothesis of con-
vexity can be rejected if there is a sufficiently large difference in the bias-adjusted
means. The sample is randomly split into two groups of observations with sample
sizes n1 and n2. Since the test is heavily dependent on this random split, I employ
Simar & Wilson’s (2020) bootstrap method for multiple sample splits. Following
Kneip et al. (2016), since the FDH estimator and the VRS estimator have different
rates of convergence, n1 and n2 are chosen so as to offset the differences. Refer-
ring back to (2.5) and solving n2/(p+q+1)1 = n
1/(p+q)
2 and n1 + n2 = n by simple
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bisection yields the appropriate sample sizes.
The VRS estimator is used on sample 1, S1,n1 , while the FDH estimator
is used on the larger sample 2, S2,n2 , since the FDH estimator has the slower
convergence rate. Estimating the Farrell (1957) output measure of efficiency for














θ̂j(Xi, Yi | S`,n`)− µ̂j,n`
]2
(2.8)
for estimator j ∈ {V RS, FDH} and ` ∈ {1, 2}.
Kneip et al. (2016) describe two different test statistics that depend on the
value of (p+q). Since I use the dimension reduction technique, I have (p+q) = 2,
so I require the use of the convexity test statistic for (p+ q) ≤ 3,
τ̂C =






d−→ N(0, 1), (2.9)
which converges in distribution to the standard normal distribution by Theorem
4.2 in Kneip et al. (2015). The bias for each sample, B̂j,κ,n` , is estimated using
the generalized jackknife method described in Kneip et al. (2016).
The convexity statistic tests H0: Ψ convex versus H1: Ψ not convex. For
each test, I use the test.convexity() function in Wilson’s (2008) FEAR package in
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R, using 10 sample splits with 1000 replications each. The test statistic is averaged
over all sample splits, and the p-values are estimated via the bootstrap method in
Simar & Wilson (2020).
2.2.2 Test for Returns to Scale of the Production Set
If I fail to reject convexity, then I also need to test for the returns to scale of the
production function. Kneip et al. (2016) and Simar & Wilson (2020) describe such
a test statistic, similar to the convexity test statistic. Here, the statistic compares
means of the VRS estimates with the means of the CRS estimates. If the difference
is sufficiently large, then the null of CRS is rejected in favor of VRS. I again
employ the N sample split method of Simar & Wilson (2020). The returns to
scale test statistic is
τ̂RTS =
(µ̂V RS,n1 − µ̂CRS,n2)−
(










) d−→ N(0, 1), (2.10)
where the sample means µ̂j,n` and sample variances σ̂
2
j,n`
are computed as in
(2.7) and (2.8) for j ∈ {V RS,CRS} and ` ∈ {1, 2}. Bias estimates B̂j,κ,n`
are again calculated using the generalized jackknife method described in Kneip
et al. (2016).
The returns to scale statistic tests H0: CRS versus H1: VRS. For each
test, I use the test.rts() function in Wilson’s (2008) FEAR package in R, using 10
sample splits with 1000 replications each. The test statistic is averaged over all
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sample splits, and the p-values are estimated via the bootstrap method in Simar &
Wilson (2020).
2.2.3 Test of Separability
In this paper, I test the effects of an environmental variable, state forfeiture law
percentages, on the efficiency estimates. In order to do this, the “separability“ con-
dition discussed in Simar & Wilson (2007) must hold. There are two ways an
environmental variable can impact production. An environmental variable can ei-
ther affect the distribution of efficiency estimates, or it can affect the production
frontier itself. The first case is an ideal situation where separability is satisfied and
second-stage regressions can be used for inference. For the second case, inference
cannot be made with second-stage regressions.
Daraio et al. (2018) introduce a statistic to test the aforementioned sepa-
rability condition. Similar to the tests of convexity and returns to scale, the idea
is to test the difference in the sample means of the unconditional and the condi-
tional estimators. The unconditional efficiency estimator is the sample mean of
the estimates unconditional on the environmental variable, forfeiture law reten-
tion percentages. The conditional efficiency estimator is the sample mean of the
efficiency estimates, conditional on the forfeiture law percentages. For the con-
ditional estimator, the production set is assumed dependent on the environmental
variable. The null hypothesis for this test is separability (the production fron-
tier is not affected by the environmental variable, and the unconditional and the
conditional sample means are equal), while the alternative is that the environmen-
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tal variable is non-separable (the environmental variable affects the production
frontier, and the difference between the unconditional and the conditional sample
means is sufficiently large).
From Daraio et al. (2018), the test statistic for values of (p + q) such that
κ ≥ 1/3 for FDH estimators or κ ≥ 2/5 for DEA estimators is
τ̂sep =








) d−→ N(0, 1), (2.11)
where µ̂n1 and µ̂c,n2,h are the unconditional and the conditional sample means for
either the FDH or DEA estimators (using the same estimator for both samples).








estimated using the generalized jackknife method described in Kneip et al. (2016).
Estimates of the conditional estimator require a smoothed estimator, which uses a
bandwidth h for each environmental variable. See Daraio et al. (2018) for more
information.
The separability test statistic tests the null hypothesis of separability against
non-separability. For each separability test, I use the test.sep.cont() function in
Wilson’s (2008) FEAR package in R with 1000 replications. The p-values are
then estimated by the bootstrap method in Simar & Wilson (2020).
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2.2.4 Second-Stage Empirical Strategy
The second-stage model estimates the effect of the environmental variable, state
civil asset forfeiture law percentages, on the estimated technical efficiencies using
a left-truncated model. Note that the second-stage model is only meaningful if the
separability condition holds. Simar & Wilson (2007) mention problems with using
simple OLS estimation and suggest a truncated model instead. Using maximum-
likelihood estimation, I estimate










) + εist, (2.12)
where
Zistβ = β0 + β1RetentionRates (2.13)
for county i in state s and year t. Left-truncation occurs at one, and the second
stage truncated model assumes separability of the environmental variables from
the technical efficiency. The efficiency estimates are denoted by θ̂ist ∈ [1,∞), the
standard normal density and distribution are denoted by φ and Φ, and the error
term is εist. The truncated model is estimated using the truncreg command in
Stata.
The variable RetentionRates is the percentage of revenue from forfeited
assets that law enforcement agencies in the state are allowed to retain for their
agency. The retention rate varies at the state level, so I cannot include state or
county fixed effects. The rates also do not change over time, thus I exclude
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time fixed effects. I estimate (2.12) for each population quintile, including two
specifications—one that does not include log(populationist) and one that does.
2.3 Data
According to the US Bureau of Justice Statistics, law enforcement is for the ”pre-
vention, detection, and investigation of crime, and the apprehension and detention
of individuals suspected of law violation.“2 Previous research in police efficiency
has used various measures of inputs x and outputs y to analyze how effectively
police departments adhere to these duties. Inputs tend to include measures of
labor and capital, while outputs are mainly the number or percentage of solved
crimes (clearance measures). Garcı́a-Sánchez et al. (2013) analyze the common
inputs and outputs used in DEA estimation of police efficiency and conclude the
most common inputs used are the number of police members, number of vehicles,
police costs, and the number of different crimes committed. The most common
outputs include the number or percentage of solved crimes with varying specifi-
cations. Following the majority of existing work, this paper uses the rate of police
employees per 1000 people in the county (including civilian and sworn officers)
and the police expenditure per 1000 people as the two inputs. I use the rates per
1000 people as a way to control for the population in the counties. For outputs,
I add to the existing literature by using both a measure of clearances and a mea-
sure of deterrence. Two outputs constitute the clearance measures—the arrest to
reported incident ratios for violent crimes and for property crimes. Two more out-
2See https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=ty=tp&tid=7.
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puts constitute the deterrence measures—the rates of incidents per capita for vio-
lent crimes and for property crimes. I standardize each variable by subtracting the
minimum value from each observation and dividing by the range. Then, since in-
cidents per capita should have a negative relationship with a county’s law enforce-
ment efficiency—having fewer crimes would make the county more efficient—I
take the additive inverse of the standardized observations for both the violent and
property incidents per capita variables and add one. Using both the clearance
and deterrence measures as outputs, my efficiency estimates will be more versa-
tile compared to others used in the literature. I then use the dimension reduction
technique to reduce the total of two inputs and four outputs to one input and one
output.
The data come from the US Census Bureau’s Census of Governments, the
FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR), and the FBI’s National Incident-Based Re-
porting System (NIBRS). Pierson et al. (2015) create a cleaned database for all the
available Census of Governments data. I pull the 2007 and 2012 data from their
database to obtain total police expenditure by county. The Census of Governments
collects comprehensive state and local finance data from individual governmental
units every five years (COG, 1977–2012). The governmental units include the
county, city, township, and special district. I aggregate the governmental units to
get a measure of police expenditure at the county level. The police expenditures
include spending on current operations, construction, and other capital outlay.
The number of employed law enforcement officers is taken from the Law
Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) data collection from the
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UCR (FBI, 2007, 2012a). The LEOKA collection reports data at the agency level,
and I again aggregate to the county level to match the expenditure data.
Arrest and reported incident data are from the NIBRS database (FBI, 2007,
2012b). I calculate the arrest to reported incident ratio for each of two groups of
incidents. Violent incidents include murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, negli-
gent manslaughter, justifiable homicide, kidnapping, rape, sodomy, sexual assault
with an object, forcible fondling, robbery, and aggravated assault. Incidents of
property crime are arson, burglary/breaking and entering, pocket-picking, purse-
snatching, shoplifting, theft, and all other larceny. Each incident in NIBRS is
recorded with a primary, secondary, and tertiary incident. I look at the primary
incident but exclude any incidents where the secondary or tertiary incident is a
victimless crime. As an example, if the primary incident is manslaughter while
the secondary incident is a drug violation, the incident observation is not counted.
The NIBRS file has an observation for each incident reported from each re-
porting agency, and each department has an agency-specific Originating Agency
Identifier (ORI). For both the violent crimes and the property crimes, the total
number of incidents and arrests is combined at the agency level by the ORI code.
To aggregate the employment and arrest data by FIPS code, and to then combine
with the expenditure data, I use the Law Enforcement Agency Identifiers cross-
walk series (ICPSR, 2012). After merging all data and dropping the outliers as
discussed in Section 2.2, I have a total of 2,478 counties coming from 2007 and
2012. It is important to note that each county-year observation is treated as a
separate firm, e.g. Platte County, NE in 2007 is different than Platte County, NE
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in 2012. This means there is no captured information when comparing the same
county in 2007 to 2012.
I use asset forfeiture rates from Holcomb et al. (2011). They collect the
asset retention rates for each state in the US. Refer back to Figure 2.1 for a heat
map of the retention rates in the data. The majority of states have a 100 percent
retention rate. There are no states with retention rates between 0 percent and 50
percent. I do not have data for the hashed states in the figure.
Data are separated into population quintiles. Tables 2.1–2.5 show summary
statistics for each subsample.3 As previously discussed, I include the expenditure
per capita and employment per capita as inputs. Outputs are the violent and prop-
erty arrest to incident ratios and the violent and property incidents per capita. In
addition, Figure 2.2 plots the data for the full sample and for each population
quintile. The x-axes for all plots are the reduced inputs and the y-axes are the re-
duced outputs, calculated by the dimension reduction technique for each subsam-
ple. The final subsamples exclude outliers detected by Wilson’s (1993) method for
outlier detection for non-parametric frontier models.4 The first quintile includes
counties with populations from 578–9,301.2, the second quintile includes coun-
ties with populations from 9,301.2–18,019.6, the third quintile includes counties
with populations from 18,019.6–33,805.6, the fourth quintile includes counties
with populations from 33,805.6–79,016.8, and the fifth quintile includes counties
with populations from 79,016.8–4,538,028.
3Summary statistic tables are all created with the Stargazer package in R by Hlavac (2018).
4I use the ap() function in Wilson’s (2008) FEAR package in R to detect the outliers.
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2.4 Results
The R values, in (2.6), from the full sample dimension reduction technique are
shown in the first row of Table 2.6. An RX of 0.904 and RY of 0.967 are well
above Wilson’s (2018) suggested range of 0.75–0.80. Following the dimension
reduction, I test for convexity, returns to scale, and separability of the full sample.
The first row in each panel of Table 2.7 shows the results of each of these tests for
the full sample. I fail to reject convexity with a p-value of 0.228, thus pointing
away from the FDH estimator and toward DEA estimators. Because the convexity
test shows the production frontier of my data is probably convex, I test the returns
to scale. For the full sample, CRS is strongly rejected in favor of VRS. Given
the results of these two tests for the full sample, I use the VRS estimator to test
the separability of the retention rate variable. The first row in the bottom panel
shows the result from this test, failing to reject separability. For the separability
test in the second row, I include both the retention rate variable and population
as environmental variables in the same test. The test rejects separability when I
include population. Since separability is rejected when population is included, but
fails to be rejected for forfeiture laws alone, I take the following strategy. First, I
separate the data into population quintiles. Then, for each of the population quin-
tiles, I estimate the bias-corrected VRS estimates. I next incorporate the truncated
regression model, and estimate (2.12) with two different specifications for each
quintile.
Before estimating the truncated regression, I confirm the convexity, returns
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to scale, and separability tests for each population quintile. These results are also
shown in Table 2.7. Each test result is consistent with the test results from the
full sample, so I use the VRS estimator to produce the bias-corrected technical
efficiency estimates.5 Table 2.8 summarizes the bias-corrected DEA efficiency
scores. They are estimated separately for each group, allowing for different fron-
tiers across the different population quintiles. These estimates are next used as the
dependent variable in estimating (2.12).
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 show the truncated regression results for each popu-
lation quintile. In both sets of results, the dependent variables are all the bias-
corrected DEA efficiency estimates. In Table 2.9, I only include the forfeiture
retention rate as the independent variable, while in Table 2.10, I also include the
log of the population as an independent variable. Keep in mind that I rejected sep-
arability on the full sample when I added population as a second environmental
variable, so the results in Table 2.10 should be taken with a grain of salt. Coeffi-
cients on the forfeiture retention rates are similar between the two specifications.
The coefficients represent the marginal effects for the independent variables. The
retention rate is statistically significant in all population quintiles except the sec-
ond. Remember that a larger efficiency score means the county’s law enforcement
is less technically efficient, so the positive coefficients signify a decrease in effi-
ciency. Referring to Table 2.9, a one percentage point increase in the retention
rate leads to a 0.000739 point decrease in technical efficiency for the first quintile.
5Note the separability tests for each quintile test separability with the forfeiture retention rates
as the only environmental variable.
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Therefore, increasing a county’s retention rate by one standard deviation, 30.55
percentage points, leads to a decrease in efficiency of 0.023 points. For the fifth
quintile, increasing the county’s retention rate by one standard deviation, 36.329
percentage points leads to a decrease in efficiency of 0.133 points. Given the stan-
dard deviations of the efficiency scores for these two population quintiles, 0.170
and 0.340, the effects are rather small, though larger in the fifth quintile—almost
half of a standard deviation. Though across the board, the coefficients are posi-
tive, indicating that the counties that are not allowed to retain any of the forfeited
assets are more technically efficient than those counties that are allowed to retain
forfeited assets.
2.5 Conclusions
The results from the truncated regressions indicate there is a negative relationship
between the forfeiture retention rate of a county and the efficiency of the law en-
forcement in that county. This is evidence supporting the theory that police output
in the form of arrests and deterrence is depleted by the presence of civil asset for-
feiture laws. The technical efficiency estimates are higher (less efficient) for the
counties with higher forfeiture retention rates. Given a set amount of funding and
officers, the counties with no ability to retain forfeited assets have higher levels of
clearance and deterrence measures.
When counties are allowed to retain some percentage of the forfeiture rev-
enues, they have the financial incentive to target crimes with a monetary payoff,
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most commonly drug crimes. In doing so, the violent and property arrest to inci-
dent ratios, as well as the amount of deterrence, appear to suffer. The results in
this paper support the other evidence piling up in the ”policing for profit“ literature
that financial incentives cause police agencies to change their behavior.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics - First Population Quintile
Statistic N Median Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure/Cap 496 99.187 120.139 83.887 0.000 568.225
Employment/Cap 496 3.066 3.439 2.399 0.129 26.210
Viol A/I 496 500 532.210 304.528 0 1,000
Prop A/I 496 107.143 161.742 191.852 0.000 1,000
Viol I/Cap 496 1.320 1.593 1.182 0.109 8.342
Prop I/Cap 496 12.835 14.932 10.324 0.186 54.767
Red. Input 496 0.101 0.119 0.074 0.003 0.489
Red. Output 496 1.367 1.377 0.174 0.918 1.799
Retention Rate 496 100 84.744 30.550 0 100
Population 496 5,874 5,596.647 2,279.101 578 9,300
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the first population quintile. Per capita is denoted as
“/Cap”, and the arrest to incident ratios are denoted as “A/I.” The violent and property arrests to incident
ratios and incidents per capita are all scaled by 1000. The reduced (Red.) input and output are the results
of the dimension reduction technique discussed in Section 2.2. Retention Rate is the percent of forfeited
assets retained by law enforcement agencies in that county.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics - Second Population Quintile
Statistic N Median Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure/Cap 491 77.853 88.221 51.377 0.000 342.216
Employment/Cap 491 2.502 2.883 2.392 0.449 26.968
Viol A/I 491 500 496.450 226.198 0.000 1,000
Prop A/I 491 120 140.039 93.247 0.000 666.667
Viol I/Cap 491 1.655 1.960 1.523 0.062 12.979
Prop I/Cap 491 16.187 18.563 11.434 0.299 64.893
Red. Input 491 0.081 0.090 0.046 0.018 0.297
Red. Output 491 1.329 1.328 0.155 0.559 1.704
Retention Rate 491 100 91.601 23.201 0 100
Population 491 13,448 13,551.200 2,563.012 9,304 18,006
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the second population quintile. Per capita is denoted as
“/Cap”, and the arrest to incident ratios are denoted as “A/I.” The violent and property arrests to incident
ratios and incidents per capita are all scaled by 1000. The reduced (Red.) input and output are the results
of the dimension reduction technique discussed in Section 2.2. Retention Rate is the percent of forfeited
assets retained by law enforcement agencies in that county.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics - Third Population Quintile
Statistic N Median Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure/Cap 494 71.408 78.897 46.210 0.000 284.033
Employment/Cap 494 2.594 2.707 1.091 0.306 9.126
Viol A/I 494 429.2 441.797 193.041 0 1,000
Prop A/I 494 126.423 139.506 77.197 0.000 611.111
Viol I/Cap 494 2.122 2.552 2.068 0.033 16.460
Prop I/Cap 494 24.540 25.691 14.426 0.355 81.315
Red. Input 494 0.076 0.082 0.038 0.007 0.286
Red. Output 494 1.256 1.247 0.173 0.342 1.679
Retention Rate 494 100 86.775 29.261 0 100
Population 494 24,757.5 25,175.260 4,361.385 18,023 33,783
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the third population quintile. Per capita is denoted as
“/Cap”, and the arrest to incident ratios are denoted as “A/I.” The violent and property arrests to incident
ratios and incidents per capita are all scaled by 1000. The reduced (Red.) input and output are the results
of the dimension reduction technique discussed in Section 2.2. Retention Rate is the percent of forfeited
assets retained by law enforcement agencies in that county.
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics - Fourth Population Quintile
Statistic N Median Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure/Cap 494 63.1 70.291 38.814 0 210
Employment/Cap 494 2.392 2.561 1.087 0.643 13.188
Viol A/I 494 389.267 402.885 167.091 0.000 1,000
Prop A/I 494 133.657 140.781 75.143 9.709 976.190
Viol I/Cap 494 2.198 2.551 2.031 0.034 16.543
Prop I/Cap 494 26.897 28.412 15.787 0.419 86.821
Red. Input 494 0.070 0.074 0.031 0.010 0.186
Red. Output 494 1.244 1.220 0.166 0.326 1.737
Retention Rate 494 100 76.164 39.629 0 100
Population 494 47,827.5 51,010.740 12,838.9 33,896 79,015
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the fourth population quintile. Per capita is denoted as
“/Cap”, and the arrest to incident ratios are denoted as “A/I.” The violent and property arrests to incident
ratios and incidents per capita are all scaled by 1000. The reduced (Red.) input and output are the results
of the dimension reduction technique discussed in Section 2.2. Retention Rate is the percent of forfeited
assets retained by law enforcement agencies in that county.
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics - Fourth Population Quintile
Statistic N Median Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure/Cap 494 63.1 70.291 38.814 0 210
Employment/Cap 494 2.392 2.561 1.087 0.643 13.188
Viol A/I 494 389.267 402.885 167.091 0.000 1,000
Prop A/I 494 133.657 140.781 75.143 9.709 976.190
Viol I/Cap 494 2.198 2.551 2.031 0.034 16.543
Prop I/Cap 494 26.897 28.412 15.787 0.419 86.821
Red. Input 494 0.070 0.074 0.031 0.010 0.186
Red. Output 494 1.244 1.220 0.166 0.326 1.737
Retention Rate 494 100 76.164 39.629 0 100
Population 494 47,827.5 51,010.740 12,838.9 33,896 79,015
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the fourth population quintile. Per capita is denoted as
“/Cap”, and the arrest to incident ratios are denoted as “A/I.” The violent and property arrests to incident
ratios and incidents per capita are all scaled by 1000. The reduced (Red.) input and output are the results
of the dimension reduction technique discussed in Section 2.2. Retention Rate is the percent of forfeited
assets retained by law enforcement agencies in that county.
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Table 2.6: R Values
RX RY






Notes: This table contains the RX
and RY values from the dimension
reduction technique, defined in (2.6).
Each Q is a population quintile.
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Table 2.7: Initial Test Results
Convexity Test Results
τ̂C P-Value






Returns to Scale Test Results
τ̂RTS P-Value








Full Sample 0.131 0.560






† The second full sample separability test includes both retention
rate and population as environmental variables.
Notes: Significance is denoted at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level by
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗. This table shows the test results from the convex-
ity, returns to scale, and separability tests for the full sample and
each population quintile. In the top panel, the convexity test tests
the null hypothesis of convexity against the alternative of non-
convexity. In the middle panel, the returns to scale test tests the
null hypothesis of CRS against the alternative of VRS. In the bot-
tom panel, the separability test tests the null hypothesis of sepa-
rability of the environmental variable(s) against the alternative of
non-separability. The separability tests were estimated with VRS
efficiency estimates.
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Table 2.8: Bias-Corrected DEA Efficiency Estimates
N Min. 1Q Median Mean St. Dev. 3Q Max.
Full Sample 2478 1.010 1.282 1.390 1.437 0.281 1.517 5.276
Q1 496 1.008 1.215 1.317 1.331 0.170 1.446 1.975
Q2 491 1.009 1.196 1.289 1.310 0.179 1.387 3.057
Q3 494 1.017 1.218 1.318 1.364 0.290 1.415 4.945
Q4 494 1.033 1.311 1.399 1.459 0.309 1.525 5.495
Q5 496 1.021 1.287 1.429 1.502 0.340 1.618 4.599
Notes: This table summarizes the bias-corrected DEA efficiency estimates for the full sample and
for each quintile. A county is technically efficient with a score of 1, and the farther from 1, the less
technically efficient a county is.
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Table 2.9: Truncated Regression Results
Dependent Variable:
Bias-Corrected DEA Scores
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Retention Rate 0.000739** 0.000124 0.00324* 0.00301*** 0.00366***
(0.000320) (0.000499) (0.00177) (0.000758) (0.000925)
Constant 1.248*** 1.255*** 0.537** 1.045*** 1.014***
(0.0296) (0.0481) (0.251) (0.0846) (0.100)
Sigma 0.188*** 0.213*** 0.529*** 0.416*** 0.459***
(0.00805) (0.0107) (0.0566) (0.0266) (0.0296)
Observations 496 491 494 494 496
Log Likelihood 195.0536 180.1395 23.1953 -50.2023 -96.7128
Notes: Significance is denoted at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level by ***, **, and *. The dependent variable
in each column is the bias-corrected DEA efficiency score. Each column contains the observations from
a different population quintile. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.10: Truncated Regression Results with Population
Dependent Variable:
Bias-Corrected DEA Scores
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Retention Rate 0.000650** 0.000127 0.00366** 0.00302*** 0.00369***
(0.000320) (0.000499) (0.00171) (0.000755) (0.000916)
log(population) 0.0408** 0.0131 0.690*** 0.120 0.0688**
(0.0185) (0.0594) (0.262) (0.103) (0.0348)
Constant 0.909*** 1.131** -6.448** -0.250 0.174
(0.158) (0.567) (2.750) (1.127) (0.448)
Sigma 0.187*** 0.213*** 0.515*** 0.414*** 0.455***
(0.00798) (0.0107) (0.0530) (0.0265) (0.0291)
Observations 496 491 494 494 496
Log Likelihood 197.505 180.164 27.199 -49.528 -94.763
Notes: Significance is denoted at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level by ***, **, and *. The dependent variable
in each column is the bias-corrected DEA efficiency score. Each column contains observations from a dif-
ferent population quintile. Standard errors are in parentheses. Note these regressions are only meaningful
if the environmental variables are separable.
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Figure 2.1: Forfeiture Retention Rates by State
Notes: This figure shows the percentage of forfeited assets that the agencies in the state can re-
tain. The hashed states are not in my data sample, while increasing darkness indicates increasing
retention percentages.
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Figure 2.2: Data Plots for Sample and Subsamples
Notes: This figure plots the data observations for the full sample and each of the population quintiles. The




LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEPENDENCE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REVENUE AND EMERGING CONSTRAINTS1
3.1 Introduction
The elected officials managing local governments in the United States are rarely
given sufficient credit for the budgetary tightrope they must navigate. Dependence
on property taxes directly connects their revenue base to the vagaries of both the
local real estate market and the broader economy. They cannot inflate away their
problems by printing money, and many states have tied their local governments to
the fiscal mast, constitutionally committing them to tax and expenditure limits that
can go so far as refunding every surplus dollar collected (Joyce & Mullins, 1991).
Come election season, they will face voters that prefer higher spending, lower
taxes, and a budget balanced by debt financing not always accessible for smaller
municipal governments (Banzhaf & Oates, 2012). Even if they navigate all of
these hurdles, should they fall short in their provision of preferred public goods or
overshoot in the levied tax burden for key constituents, their tax base may simply
choose to leave (Tiebout, 1956). Given these conditions, it should be expected that
elected officials and their bureaucratic agents will welcome with open arms any
and all sources of revenue unobstructed by constitutional and political constraints.
1The bulk of this chapter was written with Michael D. Makowsky and is forthcoming in the
Annual Review of Criminology (Graham & Makowsky, forthcoming).
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The criminal justice system, over the last thirty years, has become a com-
mon means by which local governments balance their budgets, with many munic-
ipalities going so far as to become dependent on fines and fees revenue to main-
tain solvency (Carpenter et al., 2019; Colgan, 2017a; Maciag, 2019; Makowsky,
2019). In a case study of Morrow, Riverdale, and Clarkston, Georgia, Carpen-
ter et al. (2019) found that each collected between 14%–25% of their total rev-
enues from fines and fees between 2012–2016. Revenues collected were predom-
inantly from traffic and city ordinance violations that posed little to moderate risk
to public safety, suggesting a strong revenue motivation from law enforcement.
In the wake of the Department of Justice investigation into Ferguson, Missouri
and the local government’s fiscal dependence on fines and fees levied on African-
Americans, the US Commission on Civil Rights identified 38 US city govern-
ments whose budgets were more dependent than Ferguson on similar revenues
(US Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR), 2017); Maciag (2019) identified 284
such jurisdictions.
The 2012 Census of Governments reports local government fine and for-
feiture revenues were equivalent to 7.4% of all law enforcement and court expen-
ditures within the middle quintile of reporting counties (Liu et al., 2019). Local
governments in the top 5% of counties were able to offset roughly half of these
expenditures through criminal justice collections (see Figure 3.1). These numbers
include all fines and penalties, as well as conviction-contingent fees. They do not,
as classified, include the yield from confiscated property sales, processing fees,
and supervision or incarceration fees, which are often far greater than the princi-
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pal fines.2 Baicker & Jacobson (2007) estimated that US Department of Justice
and state seizures amount to roughly $3 per capita on average (with a standard
deviation of $5). Including such revenues, we expect that far more local gov-
ernments employ a police department that generates revenues in excess of costs.
For this minority of local governments, law enforcement has become a source of
revenue depended on for fiscal solvency.3
Not only are fiscal incentives prevalent at the municipality level, but they
are also widespread in sheriff offices. Most commonly funded by county govern-
ments, sheriff offices may find themselves greedy and with an ability to cut as
many corners as possible. However, since the sheriff is elected, he needs to find
a balance between pleasing voters and taking advantage of his power and funding
resources from the county and state.
Greenblatt (2018) analyzes sheriff power and enumerates tactics used to
abuse that power. Sheriffs have been caught using only a small fraction of allotted
2Within the Census of Governments classification manual for reporting governments, rev-
enues reported as fines and forfeitures (code U30) are directed to include “Revenue from penalties
imposed for violations of law; civil penalties (e.g., for violating court orders); court fees if levied
upon conviction of a crime or violation; court-ordered restitution to crime victims where gov-
ernment actually collects the monies; and forfeits of deposits held for performance guarantees or
against loss or damage (such as forfeited bail and collateral)” and should exclude “Penalties re-
lating to tax delinquency... library fines... and sale of confiscated property (use code U99)” (US
Census Bureau, 2006). It appears that, in practice, revenues from confiscated property sales (espe-
cially prior to 2005) were likely accounted within two separate miscellaneous categories, as well
as fines and forfeitures. We can be confident in the assumption that “fines and forfeitures,” as a
category, regularly underestimates the total revenues from law enforcement for any government
entity.
3While our focus here is on local governments, it should be noted the federal government
also profits from public enforcement. In FY 2012, federal agencies collected $4.152 billion from
health care fraud lawsuits, financial sanctions, and civil and criminal penalties (Lemos & Minzner,
2013).
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funds for inmate meals, and instead, for example, investing the rest in a used car
lot. The money coming through the sheriff office tends to have little oversight by
anyone other than the sheriff, so it is relatively easy to succomb to these financial
incentives. Given that they can feed inmates as they please, it is tempting to
skim from the food fund, and purchase, say, a $70,000 muscle car (Pishko, 2019)
or a $740,000 beach house (Pfaff, 2018). While sheriff power appears to assist
monetary incentives in tempting sheriffs, fines and fees can work on their own in
other local governments.
Maciag (2019), in his construction and analysis of local government rev-
enues, finds that fines and fees have become a critical source of revenue. For each
town, city, and municipal government identified, Maciag (2019) calculates the
fines as a share of general revenues and the total fines per adult resident, reporting
the number of local governments over certain thresholds for each state. The top
ten states and totals including all states are reported in Table 3.1. Some of these
local governments collect up to 80%–90% of their general revenues from fines and
forfeitures, and others collect more than $500 per resident, suggesting the majority
of fine revenue comes from out-of-towners in those localities. These states tend
to be concentrated in the south, where there are more rural towns. Maciag (2019)
argues the biggest impact is on the smaller localities because they have smaller tax
bases and long-developed dependencies. Several of these smaller localities also
tend to circumvent legal restrictions on fine revenue. Missouri, Georgia, Mary-
land, and Texas all have caps on fine-generated revenue, but there are ways to get
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around legal restrictions, and often states simply do not enforce them.4
Given that fines and fees have become a critical revenue source, adverse
effects put the public at risk. Fiscal incentives force law enforcement agents to
target traffic citations and lucrative drug crimes instead of clearing and deterring
victim-reported violent and property crimes. Fiscal incentives create such a trade-
off between lucrative crimes and public safety (Kantor et al., 2017). Assuming the
goal of law enforcement is to protect the public and deter crime with their given
funding, this tradeoff could greatly reduce the level of efficiency with which law
enforcement agencies solve and deter crime. This decrease in efficiency is dis-
cussed further in Chapter 2.
With given resources, sheriff offices see vast differences in incentives sur-
rounding an election cycle. Election incentives lead to a decline in productivity
during election season, and thus also put the public at risk. This decline in pro-
ductivity is discussed further in Chapter 1, which gives a broad description of the
political economy of sheriff elections.
Liu et al. (2019) show that spending on police, judicial and legal services,
and corrections have increased substantially over time. Between 1982 and 2015,
expenditures within these categories increased from $388 per capita to $937 per
capita (Liu et al., 2019). There are counties whose fine and fee revenue regularly
exceeds police and judicial expenditures. A large portion of assets collected via
forfeiture, at both the federal and state levels, are seized without a criminal con-
4For example, Maciag (2019) found several localities in West Virginia that had not conducted
their required annual audits for at least five years.
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viction. Bail is too expensive for the average household income. Partially due to
the inability to post bail (Reaves, 2013), about 460,000 people are incarcerated
daily without having been convicted of a crime. Roughly two-thirds of those who
are incarcerated are charged some sort of fine or fee. Within Alabama at least half
of individuals with a felony conviction carry more than $5,000 in criminal debt,
much of which will likely never be collected (Liu et al., 2019), and those with
criminal debt have higher recidivism rates.
3.1.1 The Return of Tax Farming
The explicit establishment of law enforcement as agents of revenue generation,
particularly in sub-national governments, is not a new practice, going back to
ancient Rome (Webber & Wildavsky, 1986). Fines collected in the feudal and
seignorial courts of Europe were a significant source of revenue that lords col-
lected through their private court systems (Coşgel et al., 2011). The privilege
of retaining tax and fine revenues was typically delegated to the same entity by
provincial governors in the Ottoman Empire (Coşgel et al., 2012). Profit motives,
in the form of piecemeal employment incentives, were an explicit part of the US
criminal justice system prior to World War I (Parrillo, 2013). Tax agents received a
share of additional remittances resultant of any evasion they uncovered. Prosecu-
tors were rewarded with additional fees per conviction. In the early 20th century,
however, financially-motivated over-enforcement became a significant public con-
cern and most of these type of rewards vanished (Parrillo, 2013).
Johnson & Koyama (2014) demonstrate within an historical model how the
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piecemeal contracting of tax collection to individuals and monopsonistic cabals,
i.e. tax farming, proved crucial in 17th century Europe to the expanding of govern-
ments operating under significant capacity constraints. Giving collection agents a
direct share of the proceeds collected is a means to efficient taxation of income and
other property that is otherwise infeasible for both historic macro states and mod-
ern, smaller, sub-national governments. Incentivized as the budget-maximizing
agents of vote-maximizing principals, law enforcement in smaller cities and mu-
nicipalities in the United States have, in effect, been recast as the tax farmers from
antiquity, providing a second-best solution for capacity constrained governments.
True to historical form, it is within the smallest local governments that
we observe the greatest dependence on revenue generated by the criminal justice
system. Government revenues characterized by the largest shares from fines, non-
property seizure related forfeitures, and court fees are predominantly observed
in counties in the lowest population quartile (Figure 3.2). Similarly, the local
governments most dependent on criminal justice revenues presented in Table 3.6
from Maciag (2019) are predominantly from rural areas with smaller constituent
tax bases and limited government resources. From the point of view of govern-
ment officials seeking to sustain solvency and, in turn, the continued existence of
their own elected and paid positions, dependence on criminal justice revenues is
not just a function of opportunity, but also necessity born of limited alternatives.
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3.2 Revenue Mechanisms Within Criminal Justice
Financial sanctions are an economically sound form of punishment (Becker, 1968;
Ehrlich, 1996), but the possibility of overzealous enforcement, particularly in re-
gards to “victimless” crimes, complicates any model of optimal deterrence (Lan-
des & Posner, 1975). Virtually every step of the criminal justice process can
generate revenue at the expense of alleged offenders. The prospects for generat-
ing revenue via the criminal justice system have become so fully integrated into
local political economy that fiscal motivations cannot be left out of any model of
welfare-maximizing law enforcement.
The broad categories of sanctions that can be levied on individuals pulled
into the criminal justice system fall under the umbrella category of “legal finan-
cial obligations” (LFOs) (Logan & Wright, 2014; Ruback, 2015; Pleggenkuhle,
2018). Within the Revised Model Penal Code are six types of LFOs: (1) victim
restitution, (2) fines, (3) costs, (4) fees, (5) assessments, and (6) asset forfeitures
(American Law Institute, 2017). Victim restitution is given priority over all other
legal financial obligations; is paid by the offender, post-conviction, to the vic-
tim(s) of his crime; and, in contrast to the other five categories, cannot be used for
government expenses (American Law Institute, 2017).5
It is with the other five categories and their viability as revenue for lo-
cal governments that we concern ourselves here. Researchers, journalists, and
5The ostensible goal of restitution is not to punish the offender, but instead to restore the
victim of economic, emotional, or psychological losses (Ruback, 2015; Appleman, 2016; Martin
et al., 2018).
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government officials have compiled data on the revenues generated within each
category, to differing degrees of success. In regards to each, we will take care to
discuss what is known, while also pointing out the limitations within the available
data.
3.2.1 Fines
While costs, fees, and assessments are ostensibly imposed to cover expenses
incurred by the criminal justice system, the stated goal of fines is punishment and
deterrence (Logan & Wright, 2014; Ruback, 2015; Appleman, 2016). Fines, or
financial penalties for a crime or violation, are typically set by statute. The amount
of the fine is based on the severity of the crime, as well as the harm suffered by
the victim and the offender’s ability to pay (Ibid.). Fines do not have to be the sole
punishment for a crime; the offender may be charged a fine in conjunction with
another punishment, such as prison time (Polinsky, 2006; Bannon et al., 2010;
Ruback, 2015; Martin et al., 2018). Many fines also tend to have surcharges added
on at the outset of the fine (Logan & Wright, 2014; Appleman, 2016). Surcharges
can be flat rates or percentages of the fine, and are again a source of revenue for
the criminal justice system (Appleman, 2016).
3.2.2 Fees, Costs, and Assessments
Fees, costs, and assessments, used interchangeably here and throughout, are the
most common types of LFOs (Ruback, 2015). They all refer to an economic
sanction used as a revenue source to reimburse the criminal justice system for op-
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erating costs. They include LFOs such as administrative expenses, as well as costs
for services issued by the court and other expenditures (Ruback, 2015; Appleman,
2016).
The prevalence of fees and the dollar amounts charged have increased
substantially in recent decades (Beckett et al., 2008; Bannon et al., 2010; Beckett
& Harris, 2011). Florida, for instance, has added in excess of 20 types of financial
obligations since 1996, while also increasing several of the current fees. Fees are
charged on top of other fine and restitution charges, and are often in excess of
three times combined fine and restitution charges (Bannon et al., 2010). A woman
convicted of a drug crime in Pennsylvania in 2009 incurred fines of $500 and
restitution charges of $345, while her 26 different fees totaled $2,464 (Bannon
et al., 2010). In Alabama, depending on the city or county, a simple $20 base fine
for running a stop sign or red light can turn into $190 (Birmingham Municipal
Court)–$263 (Walker County Municipal Court) with the addition of the penalties
and surcharges (Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights (LCCR), 2017).
Various types of fees arise before a conviction. Varying by state and local-
ity, fees can be charged pre-, mid-, and post-trial. Pre-trial fees include those such
as bail charges, booking fees (Logan & Wright, 2014), or public defender fees
(Logan & Wright, 2014; Appleman, 2016). Some localities even offer optional
fees in place of going to trial, effectively buying a clean record (Ibid.). Another
option in some places for minor cases is a “deferred prosecution agreement“ (Lo-
gan & Wright, 2014). The suspect can agree to completing community service,
a drug program, etc. in exchange for the prosecutor filing charges. Following
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conviction, fees can take the form of court or prosecution costs (Logan & Wright,
2014), jury fees (Appleman, 2016), a multitude of supervision fees (Logan &
Wright, 2014; Ruback, 2015; Appleman, 2016), and jail fees that could include
telephone charges or room and board (Logan & Wright, 2014; Appleman, 2016).
For an in-depth review of fines, fees, and costs, see Martin et al. (2018).
3.2.3 Property Forfeiture and Seizure
The US Dept of Justice (2009) defines forfeiture as “the taking of property derived
from a crime, involved in a crime, or that which makes a crime easier to commit
or harder to detect without compensating the owner” (pg. 8). The forfeiture pro-
cess begins with a “seizure”, or what is effectively the changing of hands of the
property in question. The forfeiture that follows falls into one of a few categories
depending on the jurisdiction and the value of the seized property (Holcomb et al.,
2011).
At the federal level, agencies file property forfeitures as either criminal or
civil. Criminal forfeitures were first authorized in 1970 with the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and the Controlled Substances Act
(US Dept of Justice and Office of the Attorney General, 1990; Solomon, 1993;
Warchol et al., 1996; Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998). Criminal forfeiture had ini-
tially been passed with very basic guidance and only for racketeering and drug
kingpin offenses, finding limited application. As part of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act adjusted the legislation to
make criminal forfeiture a stronger asset. With motivation to stop drug traffick-
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ing, essentially any asset used in a crime or purchased with proceeds from a crime
could now be forfeited (Warchol et al., 1996). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
authorized the criminal forfeiture of “substitute assets.” If the actual property or
cash used in a criminal action is missing, law enforcement can forfeit other prop-
erty of the same value as the missing property (US Dept of Justice and Office of
the Attorney General, 1990).6
State laws place additional strictures on seized property, predominantly
with regard to the final destination of revenues generated. Statutes include re-
quirements that dedicated portions of proceeds go toward paying off debt or ed-
ucational line items (Williams, 2002). The majority of states allow some portion
to go back to the forfeiting law enforcement agency, whether the property itself
is kept and used by the department or the proceeds pay for forfeiture expenses
(Williams, 2002; Holcomb et al., 2011). Eight states prohibit local law enforce-
ment from retaining any proceeds from seized property, while the remaining 42
allow agencies to retain between 50%–100% of revenue (Holcomb et al., 2011).
State statutes mandate varying levels of standards of proof, setting a burden of
6Criminal forfeitures proceed in personam, or “against the person”. In order for the law
enforcement agency to legally obtain the asset of a person, that person must be convicted of a
crime beyond a reasonable doubt (Solomon, 1993; Warchol et al., 1996; Warchol & Johnson, 1996;
Holcomb et al., 2011). These circumstances include due process protections for the defendant
and the forfeiture does not take place until conviction (i.e., forfeiture and conviction happen at
the same time) (US Dept of Justice and Office of the Attorney General, 1990). Civil forfeitures
fall under in rem jurisdiction, or are filed “against a thing”, where the target of the forfeiture
is the property instead of the person, and do not require a formal hearing. These are typically
forfeitures of contraband, when the property is illegal in all circumstances (Warchol et al., 1996).
Administrative forfeitures are more common. With a currently capped value of $500,000, a law
enforcement agency can seize cash or other property associated with illegal activity, given probable
cause. Regardless of value, means of transportation used to carry controlled substances are also
subject to seizure (US Dept of Justice and Office of the Attorney General, 1990).
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proof more restrictive than the federal requirement of a preponderance of the evi-
dence (Holcomb et al., 2011).
Even in states with more restrictive standards of proof and limitations on
revenue retention, there remains opportunity for revenue-motivated law enforce-
ment. The federal equitable sharing program was created in 1984 with the pass-
ing of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act. State and local agencies can seize any
property associated with a felony crime (even if no charges are actually levied)
and then transfer it to federal agencies, who then return the property to the seizing
agency via the appropriate federal equitable sharing fund—the Asset Forfeiture
Fund or the Treasury Fund (Holcomb et al., 2011).
Depending on the type of case, the state and local agencies can receive up
to 80% of the proceeds back from the federal fund (Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998;
Holcomb et al., 2011). Under adoptive forfeitures, the state or local agencies seize
the property for state crimes. However, federal agencies can adopt these forfei-
tures with a transfer from the state and local agencies if the crime is also a federal
crime (Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998; Holcomb et al., 2011). State and local agen-
cies can then receive their 80% of the proceeds back, while the government keeps
the remaining 20% for costs associated with operating the federal funds (Holcomb
et al., 2011). Budget-maximizing incentives are likely to be a concern in nearly
any property seizure context (Carpenter et al., 2019). Such concerns, however, are
especially heightened with regards to equitable sharing forfeitures—proceeds can
only be used to fund law enforcement activities or officer salaries, as long as the
payment is going toward positions that were created to fill slots that were opened
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up when another officer was moved to a task force (US Dept of Justice, 2009;
Holcomb et al., 2011).
3.3 The Revenue-Motivated Law Enforcement Hypothesis
The capacity for revenue generation changes the incentives of law enforcement
agents and the government principals they serve. That said, an observed increase
in revenue generated within the criminal justice system does not necessarily imply
that fiscal motivations are a meaningful determinant of criminal justice outcomes.
Estimating the salience of these incentives on outcomes requires identifying ef-
fects separate from agent responsibilities to respond to observed conditions, deter
future crime, and provide broad public safety. Researchers within this growing lit-
erature use several strategies to estimate the impact of revenue motivations on offi-
cer discretion and the allocation of law enforcement resources. Table 3.2 presents
a breakdown of this literature, including the object of focus within the criminal
justice system, identification strategy, and observed outcomes.
A simple political economy model of law enforcement as budget-maximizing
entities within local governments serves as a sufficient starting point. Such a
model finds considerable support within the literature. Benson et al. (1995), Wor-
rall & Kovandzic (2008), Holcomb et al. (2011), and Holcomb et al. (2018) each
investigate whether law enforcement budgets are, in fact, sensitive to the manner
in which officers carry out their duties. Benson et al. (1995) observe higher non-
capital expenditure in police departments that collect more forfeited assets. Con-
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trolling for drug and other arrests and levels of crime, they find that the forfeiture
revenues are not simply substituted for other general revenues by public officials,
allowing officers to enhance their agency’s budget. Worrall & Kovandzic (2008),
Holcomb et al. (2011), and Holcomb et al. (2018) identify the effects of the state
asset forfeiture laws on measures of the federal equitable sharing payments to
agencies or municipalities. They test the hypothesis that police entities in states
that do not allow departmental retention of revenue from forfeitures are nonethe-
less able to circumvent their state laws and generate revenue through equitable
sharing. Each similarly demonstrate that states with more restrictive forfeiture
laws have higher federal equitable sharing payments. In a similar vein, Mughan
et al. (2019) examine the difference in revenue incentives between sheriff depart-
ments and municipal departments. They observe that those in the elected office
do not have as strong a response to the financial incentive as their appointed coun-
terparts, seizing far fewer assets.
Budgetary effects are persistent and self-reinforcing, as local governments
and their police departments grow dependent on the criminal justice revenues for
which they can be directly and indirectly credited (Worrall, 2001; Baicker & Ja-
cobson, 2007; Beck & Goldstein, 2017). Police officials, for all their efforts, are
likely to find themselves on little more than a budgetary treadmill. As law en-
forcement succeeds in generating revenue, the expectation of self-funding enters
into the budget, eventually displacing previous support from general funds to-
wards other expenditure line items. Each year they increase their revenue, higher
government officials will have the opportunity to reduce general fund allocations
105
for law enforcement, leaving police increasingly dependent on their own revenue
generation just to maintain their budgetary status quo. Gains to the broader mu-
nicipality may be limited as well. Carroll (2009) finds that increased non-tax
diversification of revenue sources fails to increase year-to-year local fiscal stabil-
ity.
Given the established relationship between budget incentives and revenue
generation, it logically follows that officer discretion and deployment will be sen-
sitive to the costs and benefits associated with different law enforcement out-
comes. Garrett & Wagner (2009) find that traffic tickets and citations depend on
local fiscal conditions—towns ramp up tickets while enduring budgetary short-
falls. Further in this vein, Makowsky & Stratmann (2009, 2011) observe officer
discretion depends on the residency status (in-town or out-of-town) of drivers in
conjunction with fiscal conditions. Harvey (2020) exploits variation in laws in
Canadian towns in Saskatchewan, identifying sharp discontinuities across town
borders depending on the share of citation revenues that the towns in question are
able to retain in their budgets.
Several papers explore the relationship between state-level forfeiture rev-
enue retention laws and drug arrest rates (Mast et al., 2000; Baicker & Jacob-
son, 2007; Bishopp & Worrall, 2009; Kelly & Kole, 2016; Kantor et al., 2017;
Makowsky et al., 2019). Kantor et al. (2017) build an identification strategy
around the implementation of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (im-
plementation of federal equitable sharing) and the state forfeiture retention rates.
They find that in states that otherwise limit police retention of proceeds from
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seized property, the establishment of federal equitable sharing redirected police
effort towards drug enforcement. These states subsequently produced 37% more
drug arrests while experiencing a 17% reduction in reported crime and a 22% in-
crease in roadway fatalities. Makowsky et al. (2019) find increased rates of arrests
for drug crimes, DUI, and prostitution, and higher rates of property seizure—these
increases, however, are only observed for black and Hispanic arrest rates. Sances
& You (2017) similarly observe that dependence on fine and forfeiture revenues in
local governments is increasing with the size of the constituent African-American
population.
If revenue motivations lead to greater prioritization of drug, DUI, or pros-
titution arrests, departments may, in turn, reduce the resources applied toward
violent and property crime related enforcement. If police agents target revenue-
generating activity, police effort may be substituted away from other crimes. How-
ever, departments might be generating enough revenue to put it back toward solv-
ing more violent and property crimes. Goldstein et al. (2020) study municipality
police use of own-source revenue from fines and fees towards clearing reported
violent and property crimes, using commuting zones in an instrumental variables
identification strategy. Their results support the dominance of substitution effects;
violent and property crime clearances are lower where fines and fees constitute a
greater share of total revenue. Kelly & Kole (2016) and Makowsky et al. (2019)
find weak relationships between seizure-related revenues on violent crimes, sug-
gesting that substitution of enforcement towards revenue generation is unlikely
to be at the expense of the investigation and deterrence of the highest profile and
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most serious crimes.
3.4 Suboptimal Deterrence, Bias, and Deteriorating Trust
Prior research has demonstrated the distortion of law enforcement and, in turn, its
deviation from the optimal provision of public safety when revenue concerns enter
the decision-making calculus of enforcement agents (Garoupa & Klerman, 2002).
These deviations from optimal enforcement manifest from the prioritization of
fiscal profitability, which includes not just the expected yield of individual arrests,
but also the probability that arrest proceeds will be retained and the expected costs
and benefits of associated adjudication. Goldstein et al. (2020) find that clearance
rates of violent criminal incidents reported to police decrease when the proportion
of local government revenue from fines and fees increases. The observed effect is
predominantly driven by smaller municipalities.7
It can be difficult to estimate how much debt individuals with different
criminal convictions typically incur. Fees are often not located in a single place in
the statutory code and are not collected at a single point in an individual’s crimi-
nal proceeding, making it difficult to calculate exactly how much debt a criminal
conviction might engender. Louisiana, for example, has dozens, if not hundreds,
of assessments sprawled throughout its code (Bannon et al., 2010). In FY 2018,
outstanding federal criminal debt was $126.7 billion and outstanding civil debt
7This is not to say that the directing of police resources towards areas where enforcement
yields revenue is without positive effect in the area of emphasis chosen. Makowsky & Stratmann
(2011) demonstrate that when a municipality experiencing fiscal distress has incentive to increase
the number of traffic citations issued, drivers respond by driving more conservatively, leading to
fewer traffic collisions. ? report similar findings.
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was $18.5 billion, making the total outstanding federal debt $145.2 billion (Office
of the US Attorneys, 2018). While both prisoners and non-prisoners can accumu-
late debt, prisoners are at higher risk for longer-term financial difficulties (Bannon
et al., 2010; Pleggenkuhle, 2018). Link (2019) analyzes prisoner criminal justice
debt using survey data from prisoners in the Returning Home Studies in metropoli-
tan areas of Texas, Ohio, and Illinois. In FY 2018, 44% of the prisoners in the sur-
vey had accumulated some amount of debt, with a median amount for those with
debt of $260 (Link, 2019). This personal accumulation of LFO’s can put individ-
uals in significant financial distress (Mello, 2018) and even drive them towards
crime: in a survey of individuals involved with the justice system conducted by
AACLJ and the University of Alabama-Birmingham (Alabama Appleseed Center
for Law and Justice (AACLJ), 2017), 38.3% of respondents indicated they had
committed at least one crime to pay outstanding LFO’s.
Byproduct of these distortions in law enforcement are biases against so-
cially, politically, and financially vulnerable portions of the population (Anwar
et al., 2012; Alesina & La Ferrara, 2014; Agan et al., 2018). Sances & You (2017)
find that fine and forfeiture revenues increase with the size of a county’s African
American population and that this effect is mitigated by African American rep-
resentatives on elected city councils. Makowsky et al. (2019) find that black
and Hispanic drug and DUI arrests, and associated seizures of cash and automo-
biles, increase with local deficits when police can retain proceeds from forfeited
property in their budgets, while comparable white arrests are unchanged. When
combined with institutions that are racially biased (Antonovics & Knight, 2009;
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Anwar et al., 2012; Goncalves et al., 2017), revenue-driven policing exacerbates
broader racial bias in the criminal justice system (Alabama Appleseed Center
for Law and Justice (AACLJ), 2017; US Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR),
2017).
Increased perception of law enforcement as agents of revenue generation,
less beholden to fair application of the law, undermines the legitimacy of their au-
thority (National Research Council and others, 2004; Katzenstein & Waller, 2015;
Tyler et al., 2015). Murphy et al. (2008) and Murphy & Barkworth (2014) find
that lower public estimates of police legitimacy correspond with reduced coop-
eration with police by victims or witnesses. In his review of the broad revenue
motivations behind municipal law enforcement, McBride (2018) observes that if
communities believe that “...police power is being used for illegitimate purposes,
faith and trust in officers that exercise that power would be undermined and their
ability to perform their legitimate functions would be stymied.” Given the fre-
quent bias in enforcement and the crushing financial burden it often imposes, the
emergence of law enforcement as a regressive source of revenue generation stands
a threat to law enforcement and its provision of public safety.
3.5 Proposed Legal and Policy Reforms
A variety of legislative efforts and policy proposals have emerged in recent years
with the common goals of constraining revenue-motivated law enforcement. These
efforts, however, have little choice but to exist on top of the elected leaders and
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municipal police departments of local governments that have grown dependent
on subsidizing not just police budgets, but their broader general funds. In many
cases, the fiscal solvency of an entire municipality stands threatened by limitations
on the generation and retention of revenue from the criminal justice system.
In 2018, the city of Philadelphia reached a settlement with the Institute
of Justice to reform its civil asset forfeiture laws. Within the settlement, the city
agreed to two legally binding consent decrees that committed to both restrictions
on civil forfeiture practices and to paying reparations to past victims of overzeal-
ous asset forfeiture (Wimer, 2018).8 The city also agreed to remit all future prop-
erty forfeiture proceeds to community-based drug prevention and rehabilitation
programs. This final component is noteworthy for its attempt to mitigate the direct
incentives for law enforcement to feed their own budgets through the confiscation
of assets. It, however, also leaves as an open question whether law enforcement
will remain indirectly rewarded for their ability to subsidize drug prevention and
rehabilitation programs, freeing up otherwise committed funds to return to the
general fund.
In the wake of the tragic death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri,
and the subsequent investigation by the Department of Justice, the Missouri state
legislature passed Senate Bill 5. The bill, amongst other things: placed limits on
8The settlement banned confiscation of property for drug possession and the seizure of any
cash amount less than $1,000 without strong proof of criminal activity. Police officers must record
in-depth summaries of all property seized and communicate the explicit process to retrieve seized
property. Civilians must be granted a prompt hearing if they request the return of their assets.
Reparations were to be made from a $3 million fund established by the city to compensate those
whose property was wrongfully seized.
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the percentage of revenues that municipalities could generate from traffic fines;
banned “failure to appear” charges, placed limits on the combined costs of fines
and fees, and banned jail sentences for minor traffic offenses; and eliminated the
collection of court costs if a case is dismissed (Fines & Fees Justice Center (FFJC),
2014). Perhaps most importantly, it banned jailing of individuals unable to pay a
fine, eliminating a mechanism that had effectively hailed the return of debtors
prisons.9 From a political economy point of view, the final provision of the settle-
ment is perhaps the most interesting: citizens in Missouri were granted, under the
bill, the ability to dissolve their local governments via referendum if they do not
turn over excess traffic revenues to the state.
A number of policies enacted or under consideration would mitigate the
burden of fines and fees, both on the grounds of their burden to low-income indi-
viduals and their relationship to the Excessive Fines Clause (Colgan, 2020). Col-
gan (2019)10 proposes an adjustment to how economic sanctions are collected.
Citing experiments in US localities—Staten Island, NY, Maricopa County, AZ,
and Milwaukee, WI, to name a few—her proposal outlines a day-fine structure
to account for ability to pay. The day-fine policy would use a self-reported base
income to calculate ability to pay, and then multiply by the “penalty unit,“ or the
degree of severity of the offense. In this vein, the proposed Florida SB 1328/HB
903 would eliminate driver’s license suspension for unpaid fines and fees and al-
low for smaller structured payments (Fines & Fees Justice Center (FFJC), 2020).
9See S.B. 5, 98th Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2015).
10See also Colgan (2017b) for greater detail on the merits of graduating fines with ability to
pay.
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Contra Costa County, California adopted a moratorium on adult criminal justice
fees for probation, indigent defense, and work release programs (Fines & Fees
Justice Center (FFJC), 2019).
Makowsky (2019) lays a general framework to change fiscal incentives
underlying revenue-motivated law enforcement. The core policy innovation is the
remittance of all criminal justice revenue to the state government for redistribution
back to municipal governments as per capita block grants, dampening the direct
fiscal incentive behind any discretionary arrest decision and undermining the less
than 5% of governments reliant on criminal justice revenues as a de facto form of
regressive taxation. In doing so, a state can begin the steady process of weening
local governments off of dependence on criminal justice revenue.11
3.6 Conclusions
Revenue generated through the criminal justice system has become a key com-
ponent of municipal budgets for a growing number of local governments across
the United States. Its value lies not just in its immediate value and flexibility,
but its capacity for expropriating from those whose socioeconomic or residential
status softens the political costs that would otherwise be expected from any tax
borne by fully enfranchised constituents. Police departments are not just funding
themselves—they are often subsidizing their entire municipal government.
The literature to date demonstrates the broader costs of revenue-motivated
11In a more nuanced version of the policy, Makowsky suggests that states require that any
revenues generated via law enforcement be rebated to all citizens within the state that qualified for
SNAP benefits.
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law enforcement. First and foremost, the economic damage to the marginal felon
arrestee is difficult to overstate: their lives are disrupted and expected lifetime
earnings are irrevocably damaged with the acquisition of a criminal record. Even
beyond felony and misdemeanor arrests, however, poor households rarely have
means to absorb the potentially thousands of dollars in legal financial obligations
often associated with a non-criminal citation. The secondary costs of revenue-
driven law enforcement are equally disconcerting. As budgets become more de-
pendent on the criminal justice system for revenue, the occupational incentives
facing police officers at each node of discretion in their interactions with citizens
shift more towards fiscal profit, and further from public safety.
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Table 3.1: Local Government Fines by State
Fines as a Share of General Revenues
State Over 10% Over 20% Over 30% Over 50%
Georgia 92 52 30 13
Texas 90 39 22 10
Louisiana 70 49 40 25
Oklahoma 55 42 29 14
Arkansas 44 14 11 3
New York 34 12 5 1
Illinois 33 11 4 1
Ohio 24 15 10 8
Tennessee 18 12 10 2
Missouri 18 6 2 -
TOTALS 583 284 179 80
Total Fines Per Adult Residents
State Over $100 Over $200 Over $300 Over $500
Texas 147 77 40 22
Georgia 87 54 37 19
Louisiana 66 48 36 21
Oklahoma 53 33 22 14
Ohio 41 21 16 6
Illinois 41 14 11 4
New York 39 11 4 2
Tennessee 24 14 8 6
Arkansas 19 11 10 5
Florida 19 8 6 2
TOTALS 723 363 233 124
Notes:(Upper) Number of Local Governments in each state where the sum
of fines, forfeitures, and other court revenue exceeds the stated percentage.
Top 10 states are reported. Either FY2018 or FY2017.
(Lower) Number of Local Governments in each state where the sum of
fines, forfeitures, and other court revenue per adult resident exceeds the
stated dollar value. Top 10 states reported, FY2018 and FY2017. Both
figures exclude governments i) reporting less than $100,000 in fines or other
court revenues, and ii) with insufficient public audit records that did not
respond to requests for additional information.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.1: US Debt Collections by Quintile
Notes: Reproduced here from Liu et al. (2019). Original Source: Census of Governments, US
Census Bureau 2012. Revenue from fines and forfeits includes penalties imposed for violations
of law, civic penalties, court fees if levied upon conviction, court-ordered restitutions to crime
victims, and forfeits of deposits held (such as forfeited bail and collateral). Sale of confiscated
property is not included. Police and court expenditures cover current operations, construction,
land and existing structures, as well as equipment, all for police protection and judicial and legal
functions. Data include observations at the city and county level, aggregated to the county level.
Counties in higher quintiles have higher shares of criminal debt collection.
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Figure 3.2: County Fine and Forfeiture Revenues
Notes: (Left) Figure 2A. Per Capita Fine and Forfeiture Revenues and County Population, 1977–
2012 (Right) Figure 2B. Fine and Forfeiture Share of Total Revenues and County Population,
1977–2012 Source: Census of Governments, US Census Bureau 1977–2012; author’s calcula-
tions. Notes: In 2005, the Census of Governments expanded the sample to include smaller coun-
ties, generally those with populations less than 250,000. The dotted lines denote the 25th, 50th,
and 75th percentiles of county population in the 2007 Census of Governments.
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The following tables and figures show a few introductory specifications to the base






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A6: Crime Stratification - Base Model
Dependent variable:
Drug DUI Viol A/I Prop A/I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(Running)×(B) 0.0024 0.0029 −0.0069 0.0030
(0.012 2) (0.006 5) (0.012 9) (0.004 8)
(Running)×(M) −0.0106 0.0014 −0.0429∗∗∗ −0.0029
(0.011 0) (0.008 7) (0.013 5) (0.004 3)
(Ran and Won General)×(A) −0.0040 0.0080 −0.0122 0.0001
(0.011 0) (0.006 6) (0.011 5) (0.004 1)
(Ran and Lost Primary)×(M) −0.0148 0.0095 0.0122 −0.0119
(0.033 1) (0.017 1) (0.039 7) (0.007 6)
(Ran and Lost Election)×(A) −0.0466 −0.0116 −0.0022 0.0082
(0.031 6) (0.026 6) (0.046 3) (0.017 1)
(Never Running)×(B) −0.0276∗∗ −0.0134 −0.0015 −0.0024
(0.012 8) (0.011 4) (0.022 1) (0.007 3)
(Never Running)×(M) −0.0461∗∗∗ −0.0107 −0.0132 0.0042
(0.017 5) (0.013 8) (0.027 0) (0.009 4)
(Never Running)×(A) −0.0073 −0.0162 −0.0536∗ −0.0034
(0.017 1) (0.019 6) (0.032 2) (0.011 4)
(New Sheriff) −0.0171 −0.0123 0.0429∗∗ 0.0080
(0.015 4) (0.011 2) (0.020 8) (0.007 5)
log(Population) −0.5473 −0.2072 −0.0989 0.0035
(0.382 9) (0.273 6) (0.178 0) (0.071 4)
Constant 5.4252 2.1002 1.2546 0.0160
(3.811 0) (2.726 5) (1.777 3) (0.711 7)
Month/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sheriff FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered By: Sher. Sher. Sher. Sher.
Observations 36,971 36,971 21,217 33,026
Adjusted R2 0.4528 0.4950 0.2305 0.2555
Notes: This table shows the results from the base model for stratified crime types. Both the Drug
and DUI specifications are arrests per 1000 population, while the arrest to incident ratio is denoted
by A/I. The variable B is an indicator for up to five months before the primary, M is an indicator for
between the primary and the general, and A is an indicator for up to five months after the general
election. Significance is denoted at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level by ***, **, and *. Standard errors
are robust and clustered by sheriff. 149
Figure A1: Base Model (OLS) Coefficients: Drug Arrests
Notes: This figure corresponds to Specification 1 in Table A6.
150
Figure A2: Base Model (OLS) Coefficients: DUI Arrests
Notes: This figure corresponds to Specification 2 in Table A6.
151
Figure A3: Base Model (OLS) Coefficients: Violent Arrests
Notes: This figure corresponds to Specification 3 in Table A6.
152
Figure A4: Base Model (OLS) Coefficients: Property Arrests
Notes: This figure corresponds to Specification 4 in Table A6.
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